

low prices they brought, of the fearfully glutted condition of the labor market. "God knows, I don't," said Mr. Taft when asked the cause of these conditions. Isn't it time, then, to ask God for information?

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The Wealth-Creating Power of Cities.

One of the gratifying signs of the times is the frequency with which such acute and sane editorials as this from the Saturday Evening Post of January 3d are appearing in the leading periodicals:

A scientist, discussing harbor improvement in a statistical manner, observes that "a very modest estimate for the end of the present century would make Chicago a city of ten million inhabitants." By an estimate quite as modest, based upon the experience of practically all American cities, we may say that the Chicago of the year 1999 will have created wealth to the amount of at least twenty billion dollars, and will be at her wits' ends to get hold of enough money to pay her policemen and sweep her streets. Nothing else known to man creates wealth as rapidly as a modern city. Hardly anything else has so much trouble to get enough money to keep house with. The simple accumulation of inhabitants, operating automatically, will raise the rental value of real estate manyfold. The descendants in the second generation of two small children, now at school in England, may, in 1999, be drawing every quarter in rent from certain downtown lots more money than their grandfather paid for the fee of the lots. Neither they, nor their parents, nor their grandparents may ever have set eyes on those lots, or exerted themselves by so much as the lifting of a finger to enhance their value, or even be definitely aware whether Chicago is in the United States or in Africa. The value of real estate in New York has increased about three billion dollars in ten years. The city itself did that just by growing. It will continue to do it as long as it continues to grow. Meanwhile, its own income, derived from taxes on this real estate, has increased twenty million dollars, or less than one per cent of the increased value which it has created.

It is a remarkable fact that cities do create wealth enormously, and yet are chronically poor. The same thing is true of workingmen.

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Proposed Vaccination Laws.

Defeated in the courts of Illinois (vol. xi, p. 101) the vaccination ring have set to work with the legislature to make vaccination a prerequisite to education. They have gone even further, and undertaken by a supplementary bill to enforce upon every person in the State observance of this revolting and dangerous superstition. Both bills have been introduced in the lower house. One prohibits admission to the public schools of all children not vaccinated. The other makes it a penal offense for parents or guardians to neglect or re-

fuse to cause their children or wards to be vaccinated before they are two years of age, and empowers boards of health to compel vaccination and revaccination of every inhabitant at discretion. From only one other point of view than the autocratic spirit—barbaric at that—can either of these bills be justified, and that other point of view is the commercial. If doctors wish to vaccinate, and can find voluntary victims, no one need protest. We may even excuse ourselves for allowing parents to let them put vaccine poison into the blood of helpless babies. The law cannot fly in the face of established superstitions. But when it comes to legislating against education by making vaccination a condition, and especially when it comes to compelling everybody to submit to vaccination and revaccination at the will of boards of health, the extreme of tolerance has been passed.

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A curious feature of one of these bills, a feature somewhat significant in its animus, is the penal clause. For refusal to submit to vaccination, the penalty is five dollars! This would be reasonable enough if the object of the bill were, as possibly it is, to compel the people to patronize vaccination doctors and vaccine farmers. But as a punishment for making one's self a menace to the public health, as it purports to be, this five dollar penalty makes the bill "look like thirty cents."

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THE ETHICS OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT.

Much of the controversy of this exceedingly controversial period turns upon the use of words in one sense and their apprehension in another. At a time when the clash of mind with mind is under less restraint from authority than ever before, this is inevitable unless disputants take pains to make their principal terms precisely indicative of their principal thought. Any expression of opinion, therefore, on the ethics of the social movement demands a precise explanation of the sense in which the term "ethics" is used.

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In our understanding, then, the term is almost synonymous with justice.

But justice also is a word of many and even divergent connotations. It may remind us of concepts as far apart as that of the justice of just men made perfect, and that of the justice which was the one thing that the vagabond prisoner in the story was afraid the jury might give him. We may think of it as a watchword of revenge—as the

justice of an eye for an eye, of a tooth for a tooth, of a life for a life; as the justice, in brief, of our criminal jurisprudence, which is as little like ethical justice as two different things can possibly be.

So we should say that the justice we mean when we associate the word with ethics is the justice that implies righteousness, were it not that here again we have a confusion of connotations. Those of us who were brought up upon the religious diet of half a century ago, are hardly able to dissociate the word "righteousness" from pietistic images. It recalls mental pictures of another life, of a life of harps and crowns and a great white throne at the upper end of an infinite perpendicular; and it suggests for this life habits of perfunctory thanksgiving three times a day, and attendance at least once a week upon "opportunities for grace," together with such self-sacrifice as never lying about small matters and never saying "damn" aloud. Those of us who learned the word in its pietistic uses are not quick at thinking of righteousness as a verbal short cut for the idea of right adjustments.

But it is in that sense that we here consider righteousness, justice, and ethics as related terms. We could say, for instance, that a machine is righteous when its parts are rightly adjusted, and it works. Yet we should hardly call it a just machine, or an ethical machine. Righteousness is the more comprehensive term. It may be aptly used to imply right adjustments with reference to physical as well as moral law; but justice refers, as ethics does, to right adjustments with reference to moral law alone.

Were we to translate our understanding and use of these words into the slang of the day, borrowed from card games but respectabilized by Presidential usage, we should say that both ethics and justice belong to the same family with the "square deal." If, however, we were required to define them with an approximation to scholarly terms, we should say that justice is the essence or principle of the moral law, and that ethics is the science or study of the moral law.

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In making this definition we are not unmindful of the controversy over the fact of a moral law. But while it is sometimes asserted in terms that man invents the only moral laws there are, we should probably find if we all expressed ourselves with perfect clearness, that the nub of this controversy is really not over the fact of such a law.

Everyone tacitly acknowledges the fact of moral

law when he tries to cultivate the ethical faculty of righteousness, just as he acknowledges the fact of physical law when he tries to understand the righteousness—rightness if you prefer—of physical phenomena. He may indeed say that morals are emanations from matter, or he may say the reverse, that matter is an emanation from mind with moral potentialities; but that there is a moral order analogous to that which on the physical plane we call natural law, he tacitly accepts.

It makes no practical difference, however, with those who really seek to establish ethical relationships, whether they believe that mind and morals emanate from matter or that matter emanates from mind and morals, whether they believe that moral law is intuitively perceived or is an invention of moral codes. In either case there must be an underlying order of moral conduct, whether it emanates from material forces and is what we call expediency, or from spiritual forces and is what we call morality.

For ourselves, we believe, with reference to moral as to physical law, that its manifestations are perceived in the one case by a moral and in the other by a physical sense—and that it is the function of progressive science to discover in morals as in physics the modes of the operation of these laws.

As an example of the adaptation of physical means to physical ends, we perceive the sun but we must discover its modes of operation by scientific investigation. So we perceive with a moral sense, through the principle of the Golden Rule, for example, the righteousness of the "square deal," which we call justice; but we must discover its modes of operation by a scientific investigation, which we call ethics.

In that view of the matter it is easy to understand, what the truth clearly is, that ethics differs with time, place, circumstances, and social class. But these differences are only analogous to the differences with time, place, circumstances, and scientific cult, in respect to physical science. As the solar system was a fact before science discovered it, changes in science are not changes in the solar system, but in our apprehension of it. So justice may be the eternal principle, from everlasting unto everlasting, and changes in ethics therefore not changes in justice but in our apprehensions of justice.

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Ethics has changed, and will again, no doubt, as physical science has and will. But ethics will change for the better or the worse as we listen, in cultivating ethical science, to the still small voice that always admonishes even the worst of us to do

the right thing morally as we understand the right, and not the wrong thing morally as we understand the wrong.

It does not indeed tell us what particular thing is right or wrong. We ascertain that through variously distorted media—our personal selfishness, it may be, or our religious training, our political training, our class associations, our ignorance, our bad logic, or what not. Some of these influences do indeed make ethical science more variant than physical science. Let us imagine, said Macaulay, what would have been the history of the scientific apprehension of the law of gravitation if there had been any influential selfish interest that found it necessary to deny that law. But all who have not wholly given themselves over to become conscious beasts of prey, who have not committed the unpardonable sin of putting out their moral eyesight, of blinding their moral perceptiveness, want to do the right thing, the fair thing, the square thing, the righteous thing morally, the just thing, no matter how bad a fist they make of it in practice. It is the function of ethics, then, to particularize what is just and right and fair by scientific observation and logical deduction.

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This function attaches to individual relationships where we have developed the science of ethics to a high degree—theoretically at any rate, whether practically or not.

We have discovered that the natural law of justice in its individual applications condemns theft, and also the covetousness that leads on to it and which is theft in the heart. That it condemns murder, and also the hate that leads on to it and which is murder in the heart. We have learned to teach respect for life and property in individual intercourse not only as an intuitive recognition of the moral law, but as a discovery by ethical science of the fact that moral law, like physical law, has its consequences of good for obedience and of evil for defiance.

We see that unless human life and individual property are respected in individual intercourse, there is a disturbance of equilibrium which degrades the aggressor no less than it injures his victim, though it may be in a different way. We have learned, moreover, that respect for life and property in individual transactions is essential to social stability and social advance. A stable and progressive society where individual theft and murder are fostered, has come to be unthinkable.

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But in learning the lesson of individual right-

eousness, we have forgotten in part, and in part distorted, the lesson of social righteousness. While ethics has discovered enough of the moral law of justice to establish generally recognized principles of what ought to govern conduct between individual and individual, it has not advanced to the point of understanding the bearing of the moral law upon the relation of society to the individual and of the individual to society.

In the matter of human life, society has not yet seen that it is sacred in social concerns, and so we have aggressive warfare and are proud of it, as we also have child labor and defend it. In the matter of property, society does not recognize that common property is sacred; and so there are governmental privileges which make individual property of what by its nature is common property. In learning of the moral law of property as the law of "mine and thine," we have overlooked the truth which it is the function of ethical science to discover and expound, that the moral law is not a law of "mine and thine," but one of "mine," "thine" and "ours."

My property is that which in a square deal I get for my contributions to the aggregate of property. Your property, and yours, and yours, is that which in a square deal you get for your contributions to the aggregate of property. But in addition to your property and mine, there is in all social centers property which neither you nor I nor anyone else can have as our share without depriving someone of his share and obstructing the natural development of the social organism.

No one of us contributes this share individually. It is a surplus which all contribute in common. And its control attaches to objects which are not produced, but which all must use in production. This property is "ours" as distinguished from "mine" and "thine." That is to say, there is such a thing according to justice, according to righteousness, according to right moral adjustments, as "my" property if I earn it, and such a thing as "your" property if you earn it, and such a thing as "our" property, the common property, the social property.

Now it is the function of ethics as we see it to distinguish in accordance with the demands of the moral law, with the law of justice, the kind of property that may be "mine," the kind that may be "yours," and the kind that must be "ours." And this it seems to us indicates the relation of ethics to the social movement.

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For the social movement, unless it is a species of panic, is an orderly movement, seeking a right

adaptation of economic and political forces. Its general course must either be toward justice or away from justice—toward or away from the square deal.

If away from it, it will be immoral and unsocial. Immoral from the point of view of the intuitionist, unworkable from the point of view of the utilitarian, and unsocial from the point of view of both. To the intuitionist the moral law is the integrating force of human society, without which we could no more have social life than we could have physical forms without physical forces. The utilitarian reaches the same conclusion through another channel. With him as well as with the intuitionist, the recognition of moral adjustments is a necessity of social life.

With the one it may appear that obedience to moral law is the first consideration, and utility something that will then take care of itself. You put your penny in the slot—the right slot as near as you can tell—and let God do the rest. Whereas with the other, utility is the first consideration, utility in the broad sense of the universal good. Of the intuitionist it might be said that he would do right *though* the heavens fall, and of the utilitarian that he would do right *lest* the heavens fall. But both will agree that justice between individual and individual is a *sine qua non* of social life.

As a logical consequence both should agree that justice between society and the individual is also a *sine qua non* of social life. What more important field than this for ethics to explore? And how better can ethical science explore it than by subjecting questions of property to logical tests upon the premises afforded by economic observation. How better than this can ethics be related to the social movement?

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It is obvious that there can be but one kind of individual property ethically.

Slaves have been property, but slaves are men; and what ethical scientist would now have the hardihood to assert that the ownership of one man by another is ethical? He may be lavish enough with ethical objections to righting the wrong, but he cannot defend it as ethical. Or he may resort to the vagary of a dwindling school of economists who obscure the ethics of property by wrapping all property in the psychological mantle of values, so that so many men appear as so many dollars differing in no respect, moral or otherwise, from so many horses or automobiles that likewise appear as so many dollars.

So it happens that the earth, our natural standing-room and place of supplies, is treated as prop-

erty; but there are no ethical principles to defend it and none can be found. It is only by thrusting ethics aside, or obscuring it with the value-mask so as to make so much standing room on the planet appear as so many dollars, or by diverting attention from permanent social injustice to temporary individual hardship in righting it, that any pretense of defense is made.

As the social movement develops, however, and ethical science probes deeper into the secrets of the moral law, as physical science has probed into the secrets of physical law, the truth will become clearer that recognition of property in the planet is a denial of just property—not only of the integrity of “our” property as common property, but of “my” individual property and “yours.” In other words, by ignoring the idea of “ours” in the moral law of property, we undermine the idea of “mine” and “thine”; for all the elements of the law of “mine, thine and ours” are interdependent.

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What is it that gives property and to whom?

Nature gives it, and to the producer. If he parts with it he does so either voluntarily or under compulsion. If under compulsion, it is contrary to justice, contrary to social integration, and therefore unethical. And doesn't he give under compulsion when he gives his product to another in exchange for use of the common planet?

Doubtless some will say “Yes!” to that bald question; but contend that there is another element to the problem. If he pays for the use of the planet at a particular place where society makes industry exceptionally productive, he gets something from society, and his payment is really as voluntary as any other trade on the basis of a square deal. It is a special social advantage. Very true; but to whom should he pay to make this a square deal? To society. Not to a planet monopolist, but to society.

Let ethical science pursue this line of inquiry into the phenomena of the moral law, and it will find that all production is divisible into the individual producer's share and society's share.

What is the individual producer's share? All that he produces except what is society's share.

What is society's share? Not all that social advance makes possible, for that would leave nothing to the individual but what he would get in primitive conditions. It would make no allowance for increased individual efficiency in consequence of social advance. It would return nothing to the individual, as individual, for his work in assimilating accumulated knowledge. And let us remember, by the way, that what society accumu-

lates for us is not property but knowledge, and that we don't get this unless we do the work necessary to make it our own. True, the benefits of social advance would not go to the individual as an individual if all the results of social advance were considered as social property. Yet the use of social knowledge depends upon individual effort. Then why are not the results of that effort the individual property of the individuals who produce those results, in proportion to the labor they individually contribute? But if that were so what would be society's share? Isn't it so much as goes to individuals in consequence of superior locations? This is "ours" as distinguished from "mine" or "thine."

What has ethical science to say of that division?

Isn't it fair? Wouldn't it be a square deal? Isn't it probable that it is in accordance with the moral law? Isn't it the function of ethics then to demonstrate either the truth or the falsity of that probability by scientific methods; and then, according to the demonstration, either to promote or discourage the social movement in its tendency away from or toward that goal?

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Are we asked pragmatically, "Cui bono?" how is it practicable? what's the use?

Henry George has shown its practicability. Have you tried to understand him? The essence of his proposition is this, that the income which we ordinarily but loosely call ground rent is the social share of production. It is the annual price of locations giving superior social advantages. Take this fund for common use and exempt your just property and mine from taxation.

The method is immaterial. Simple methods are known to economists and publicists, so we need not try to shirk an ethical obligation by the baby plea of "It can't be done." It is no function of ethics to invent details of statesmanship. The business of ethical science is with the moral law and social expediency along moral lines, and not with the mere journey work of government.

By standing for this freedom of the individual from exactions for government from his individual earnings, and retaining for government the common fund due to advantages of location which must be secured, ethical scientists will obey the moral law of property—the law of mine, thine and ours.

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When ethical science shall have proclaimed and statesmanship shall have applied this law of property—the law of mine, thine and ours—great will

be the social reward. For obedience to the moral law has its rewards as disobedience has its penalties. In making that distinction society will get something more than the common fund. It will have made it profitable to use the earth and unprofitable to forestall its use, in consequence of which the earth will offer to industry free of exaction a large area of useful locations now unused; and wealth will be enormously multiplied, and equitably distributed among the earners. Only locations with social advantages—not benefits merely, but advantages—would yield an income, and this would go to society; incomes due to individual use would go to individual workers in untrammelled exchange in proportion to their use.

It is the function of ethics to promote this tendency, because this is the moral tendency, the just tendency, the righteous tendency, the practical tendency of social development.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE

AUSTRALIA.

Corowa, N. S. W., Australia, January 16.—Politics in the State of Victoria (p. 102) took another turn on the 29th of December, when the Labor party, at the State elections, gained six seats in the Victoria parliament. This party now has a membership of 21 in a House of 65.

The rest of the new House was at first divided into two sections, ministerialists and anti-ministerialists, in nearly equal numbers; but after some negotiation a fusion of these was made, and a Government formed with Mr. John Murray as Premier, half of the ministers being chosen from each section.

The new Premier states that the principal planks in his program will be progressive land legislation and land taxation; but the personnel of his ministry makes it appear unlikely that a proper system of land value taxation will be adopted.

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Both in Victoria and New South Wales there is constant demand for land for farming purposes. The Governments are trying to meet this by "closer settlement" schemes. Large estates, used chiefly for grazing sheep and cattle, are purchased, and divided into small holdings suitable for farms, which are sold on easy terms.

On account of the great expense of buying large areas, only a comparatively few settlers can every year be provided with farms by this means. The chief effect is to raise land values and rents generally, thus rendering it more difficult for all land users who are not also land owners to make a living.

The Labor party opposes land purchase and advocates instead progressive land value taxation with a high exemption. This would be unjust, and could to a great extent be easily evaded by making dummy subdivisions of the land into areas whose value would come within the exemption limit.