favor of eliminating the clause. His vote made the Lodge-Root amendment unimportant and it was not inserted. But other amendments were adopted. By these it is provided that arbitration under the treaties shall not apply to questions affecting the admission of aliens to the United States, the admission of aliens to schools in the several States, the territorial integrity of the States or the United States, the alleged indebtedness or moneyed obligation of any State, nor any question involving the Monroe doctrine or other purely governmental policy. Thus amended the treaties were ratified by a vote of 76 to 3.

The Roosevelt-Taft Campaign.

An active and by no means friendly campaign for the Presidency has begun between President Taft and ex-president Roosevelt personally. President Taft left Washington last week for a speaking campaign in the West. He spent the 8th in touring eastern and northern Ohio, closing the day with a speech at a large meeting in Toledo. In his Toledo speech, Mr. Taft took up Mr. Roosevelt's policy of "recall of judicial decisions," saying:

> This is a remarkable suggestion and one which is so contrary to anything in government heretofore proposed that it is hard to give to it the serious consideration which it deserves because of its advocates and of the conditions under which it is advanced. What this recall of decisions will amount to if applied to Constitutional questions is that there will be a suspension of the Constitution to enable a temporary majority of the electorate to enforce a popular but invalid act. . . . A most serious objection to the recall of decisions is that it destroys all probability of consistency in Constitutional interpretation. The majority which sustains one law is not the majority which comes to consider another, and the obligation of consistency of popular decision is one which would sit most lightly on each recurring electorate, and the operation of the system would result in suspension or application of Constitutional guarantees according to popular whim. We would have then a system of suspending the Constitution to meet special instances. But the main argument used to sustain such a popular review of judicial decisions is that if the people are competent to establish a Constitution they are competent to interpret it, and that this recall of decision is nothing but the exercise of the power of interpretation. This is clearly a fallacious argument. The approval of general principles in a Constitution on one hand and the interpretation of a statute and consideration of its probable operation in a particular case and its possible infringement of a general principle on the other hand are very different things. The one is simple, the latter complex; and the latter, when submitted to a popular vote is much more likely to be turned into an issue of general approval or disapproval of the act on its merits for the special purpose of its enactment than upon its violation of the Constitution. Moreover, a popular majority does not adopt a Constitution, or any principle of it, or amend its terms, until after it has been adopted by a Constitutional convention or a legislature, and the final adoption is, and ought to be, surrounded with such checks and delays as to secure deliberation. . . . Would we not, in giving such powerful effect to the momentary impulse of a majority of an electorate, prepare the way for the possible exercise of the greatest tyranny? Finally, I ask what is the necessity for such a crude, revolutionary, fitful and unstable way of reversing judicial constructions of the Constitution? Why, if the construction is wrong, can it not be righted by Constitutional amendment? An answer made to this is that the same judges would construe the amendment and defeat the popular will as in the first instance. This assumes dishonesty and a gross violation of their oaths of duty on the part of the judges, a hypothesis utterly untenable. . . . Such a proposal as this is utterly without merit or utility, and, instead of being progressive, is reactionary; instead of being in the interest of all the people and of the stability of popular government, is sowing the seeds of confusion and tyranny.

Mr. Taft's speeches in Chicago, where he came on the 9th, are along the same lines of cleavage between himself and Mr. Roosevelt; and on the 9th Mr. Roosevelt announced that he also would take the stump. [See current volume, pages 201, 219.]

Edward F. Dunne's Platform.

As the progressive candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor of Illinois at the direct primaries in April, Edward F. Dunne, formerly Mayor of Chicago, published his platform on the 10th. Its principal declarations are as follows:

> (1) Abolition of the State Board of Equalization, its functions to be performed by a commission of experts appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, who shall sit the year around in open session and preserve minutes and records of its daily proceedings. (2) A direct primary law applicable to United States Senators and Presidential electors. (3) A corrupt practices act limiting the amount of a candidate's election expenses and requiring the publication of the same before and after election. (4) Legislation providing for an amendment to the State Constitution permitting the enactment of laws providing for the Initiative and Referendum. (5) Consolidation of the park boards of Chicago into one body under city control.

[See current volume, page 111.]

The Ohio Constitutional Convention.

Woman suffrage in Ohio is to be an issue before the people of that State at the ratification election, the Constitutional Convention having on the 7th adopted the woman suffrage amendment by a vote of 76 to 33. As there are 119 delegates, this is a majority of 17 over all. The amendment will be submitted to the people as a separate proposition. [See current volume, page 227.]