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Judge Parker's letter of acceptance is in almost every respect in pleasing contrast with President Roosevelt's (p. 369). It is infinitely superior in manners. It is statesmanlike in tone. It is free from misrepresentation. It is democratic in spirit. The tendency of its influence is away from the "going" policy of benevolent aggression, and toward those ideals of government which contemplate the fullest liberty for each individual within the limits of like liberty for every other. —

In his indications of party purposes Judge Parker rises to democratic heights. Economy of administration in place of extravagance; the strong and steady hand of impartial law, in place of fluctuating regulations by political oligarchies or individual caprice; equal opportunity instead of special privilege; popular rule instead of benevolent despotism—what more than adherence to these principles could be asked of any President by the democracy of any party? If Judge Parker's letter had begun and ended with the peroration, in which these purposes are summarized, it would have put democratic life into his campaign. From the pen of a man who can say, as Parker does, that he has put aside congenial work to which he had expected to devote his life, in order to unite his party for the promotion of those principles, this peroration in itself is a stirring appeal. —

But many there are who, when they read the whole letter, will wonder how deep seated and vital

with Judge Parker those principles really are. Without suspecting his sincerity in the least, they may well question his perception and the intelligence of his purposes; and questioning, they may doubt whether, after all, his administration would differ much from Roosevelt's. To doubt in such a case is most likely to decide against Judge Parker. Party men, who feel that this campaign is not the last in which the Democratic party will engage, and rightly judge that their proper place this Fall is in party harness no matter what their views may be as to present party control—men like Bryan and Johnson and Garvin, and thousands of lesser leaders who believe and feel with them—will find it far more difficult to keep their followers within party lines on the basis of Parker's letter as a whole than would be possible on the basis of its peroration alone. —

This is not to say that the letter as a whole is in every respect discouraging. It is far from that. We have spoken already of the peroration as inspiring. Other generalizations are equally so, notably the passage on foreign relations. Nor are all the points of detail objectionable. What is said, for instance, of administrative economy, is welcome; and this is no minor point, for governmental extravagance fosters plutocracy. What is said of the pension usurpation is not only sound, but courageous. It has the same ring of defiance that characterized Judge Parker's gold telegram. Yet in comparison with other parts of his letter it tends to intensify the wish that he might meet larger questions in like spirit. The same definiteness and courage with which he has defied bimetalists and Roosevelt's autocratic pension order,

would shine much more gloriously in defiance of the powerful plutocratic forces that really threaten the popular liberties of this Republic. —

Having injected the gold standard question into the campaign, although it was not an issue and had therefore been carefully excluded from the platform, and having emphasized it in his speech, Judge Parker now renews in his letter of acceptance his expressions of perpetual loyalty to that theory of finance. This is in opposition to the only declarations on the subject his party has ever made, and in harmony with those of only one party in this country—the Republican. On that question there is admittedly no difference between him and his adversary, Mr. Roosevelt; and gold standard men who do not prefer Judge Parker for other reasons are unlikely to swap gold-standard horses. Bimetallists, on the other hand, unless strongly driven toward him by other considerations, are almost certain to vote against him in resentment of his gratuitous assault upon their doctrines. —

On the question of imperialism, Judge Parker's letter strikes the true note until it descends to particulars. His letter is in this respect far better than his speech (p. 273), for he now makes it perfectly clear that he looks forward to action regarding the Philippines similar to our action toward Cuba. But he distinctly swings away from the platform of his party when he favors promising independence to the Filipinos "as soon as they are reasonably prepared for it." The platform demands that we shall grant them independence "upon suitable guarantees of protection to citizens of our own and other countries resident there at the time of our withdrawal." Why has Judge

Parker amended his party platform in this respect? Why does he substitute for a positive platform declaration this elastic pledge to make that declaration good when the Filipinos "are reasonably prepared"? Is it possible to read into that substitute pledge—which must, under all the circumstances, have been deliberately framed—anything more than a purpose to let the question of Philippine independence drift? Who shall say, and by what tests, when this promise matures? Who can decide when any people are "reasonably prepared" for independence? Judge Parker's letter leaves the decision to the good pleasure of the very "benevolent despotism" which in his peroration he condemns. These verbal variations as to the Philippine question are not reassuring. While it is easy to see many reasons for voting for Parker in preference to Roosevelt, the difference in pledges of the two candidates regarding the Philippine question is not one of those reasons. Better by far for the Filipinos and for this Republic, that the imperialists carry their policy of benevolent despotism to the point of reaction under Roosevelt, than that the anti-imperialists be placed in a position of acquiescence in the same policy under Parker. Under Roosevelt, elected against anti-imperial sentiment, the policy can be combatted; under Parker, elected by anti-imperialists, it would have to be regarded thenceforth as the settled policy of the country.

On the tariff question, Judge Parker says much in a general way that is most encouraging. The principle of equal opportunity in place of special privilege which he states in his peroration is well amplified in the body of his letter; and he takes unmistakable ground for revenue tariffs only. These he refers to as defining an old difference in principle between the parties, and asserts that "this difference of principle still obtains." But when he gets down to detail, it is not a revenue tariff that he proposes, but "tariff reform."

This offense might be overlooked if he had explained that the obstacles in the way of securing tariff for revenue are practically insurmountable, and that the goal must therefore be sought step by step. But that is not his explanation. He shies at the principle of tariff for revenue only, not because of the legal and political obstacles in the way, but because it would "disturb business conditions." In other words, protection, which Judge Parker's platform declares to be "robbery of the many for the benefit of the few," must be continued indefinitely, in slowly diminishing degrees, lest business conditions suffer by speedy change.

Any man ought to know that the "business conditions" which depend upon robbery will be disturbed as well by slowly reforming the robbery as by abolishing it. They won't be disturbed as badly, that is true; but for this very reason they will be all the stronger to stimulate reaction against the reform. By the same token the business interests that do not depend upon robbery will assert themselves all the more quickly and strongly for being at once restored to their rights.

Judge Parker's idea that "tariff reform should be prudently and sagaciously undertaken, on scientific principles," with a view to avoiding any disturbance of "business conditions," is discouragingly suggestive of Mr. Cleveland's tariff performance. He, too, was afraid to disturb business conditions. He, too, therefore shied at the logic of the platform. He, too, had visions of "prudently" and "sagaciously" reforming protection robbery on "scientific principles." The result may be read in the election returns of 1894 and the Dingley tariff subsequently adopted. When the Democratic tariff "scientists" brought their "prudence" and "sagacity" to bear upon "tariff reform," they turned out as pretty a piece of protection legislation, on a slightly reduced scale, as the "prudent" and "sagacious" Re-

publican tariff "scientists" had cursed the honest business interests of the country with. What wonder, after this, if the people, intending by their votes in 1892 to condemn protection as robbery, turned in despair to other theories in explanation of their impoverishment, and so made possible that Democratic disorganization which in 1896 opened wide the door to McKinleyism? History sometimes repeats itself, and Parker's election this year, if it were possible, might prove to be like Cleveland's in 1892, the best conceivable prophecy of an overwhelming reaction four years later in favor of the Republicans.

Readers interested in the remarkable disclosures of the new system of valuations for taxation in New York (vol. vi, p. 724), may now procure, at slight expense, official reports of some of the more important results. Under this system improvement values and site values are stated separately. The first assessment under the system has shown that the taxable site values of New York City are 60 per cent., while the taxable improvement values are only 40 per cent., of the total value of all the taxable real estate of the city. More interesting and significant, however, than this general result, are the details, which show that in cases where improvements are most valuable, the site value is farthest in excess of the improvement value. For instance, the aggregate values of ten recently constructed and largest office buildings of the city are 75 per cent. of the total value of sites and improvements together, these costly buildings having a value of only 25 per cent. of the total—only one-third as much as the value of the lots on which they stand. As the New York tax law requires the publication of assessments, any one desiring it may, at a cost of 25 cents for the report and 10 cents for postage, 35 cents in all, procure the full assessment for so much of the borough of Manhattan as lies south of Grand street. This report, which itemizes each piece of real estate, giv-