law at its head and sensational newspapers pushing it along from behind. The probability is, if Dowie is the fakir he is charged with being, that he will get more out of this prosecution than his enemies will. It savors too much of persecution to do him any harm.

Perhaps the worst form this persecution has taken is the withdrawal of clearing house facilities from the large banking establishment which is part of the Dowie ecclesiastical and economic outfit. There is no pretense that Dowie's bank is unsafe. On the contrary, the president of the bank through which it has "cleared" testifies that "it has always promptly fulfilled its obligations in a thoroughly business-like way, and even now has a very substantial balance to its credit." The reason assigned for cutting it off from exchange facilities is that the president of the "clearing" bank does not wish to be placed in the position of being in any way connected with an establishment of Dowie's, in view of the present public sentiment! That is not a financial reason. It raises nothing but a question of the unpopularity of a depositor. It is a reason which might as well justify the financial wrecking of any other depositor who became unpopular, or against whom a hue and cry was raised; and it introduces into commercial life a new element of danger to business men of independent habits of thought.

Mr. Edison having discovered how to make "Portland cement" at extremely low cost, expects to drive quarried stone and brick out of use as building materials. It will consequently cost comparatively little to build houses, or rather to "pour" them, for when houses are made of cement, they will be "poured," instead of built. Since it will thus cost so little to make a house, Mr. Edison thinks "rents will be very low." Evidently Mr. Edison is a better inventor than political economist. The cost of house building has been very much reduced in the past by many labor-saving inventions, but rents are higher than ever.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SLAUGHTER.

". . . . From the time that Bryan made his first speech of acceptance to the week of the election, any war on the Filipinos was a useless slaughter. . . . . Every one of the outrages followed closely on some demonstration in favor of the insurgents' cause in the United States.

The above is plucked from a reported statement by Gen. F. D. Grant, regarding much death and devastation in the Philippines, consequent upon the effort of our government to subjugate the people of those islands, in connection with the candidacy for the presidency of Mr. Bryan, who received 6,374,397 votes in the late presidential election—46 per cent. of the total cast. The argument of Gen. Grant's statement is that the opposition to McKinley's reelection is responsible for all the slaughter and outrage which the horror-struck general portrays as going on during the presidential campaign.

Queer logic!

A single inquiry would seem to knock it badly in the head. Who are responsible for the bloodshed and misery of an unjust and unholy war—they who begin or those who object to it?

Of course this argumentation of the son of Gen. Grant, of Appomattox, is nothing new. We heard it over and over from the republican stump in the campaign of the "full dinner pail." But what better could illustrate the wrong-headedness of this whole Philippine crusade of the government, in violence, not alone of every republican principle we ever professed as a people, but in flagrant defiance of the decalogue, the golden rule and the sermon on the mount? No matter what a government may do—whatever enormities it may undertake, criticism and protest must be withheld, lest as a result of the government's determination to push ahead in its evil course there may be bloodshed and desolation!

Could unreason go further? Could meanness itself?

So the wolf upbraided the lamb for defiling the stream. So the burglar should indict the householder for defending his home. So the tyrant excuses his tyranny, for who would be tyrannized if everybody submitted cheerfully to the tyrant's will in advance? Such logic is not only medieval darkness, it is too brutal for toleration among pirates. Barbarism of the lowest grade contemns it.

But there is another thing to be said. It may be repetition, but repetition is necessary in these times. It was in the time of the revolution; it was in the time of the rebellion; it was in the time of the Man of Nazareth; it was in the time of Martin Luther, and in the time of many a reformer before and since Luther, who "resolved to enter Worms in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, although as many devils should set at him as there were tiles on the housetops." It has been said, and it is here repeated, that before the advent of Dewey or Merritt in the orient, or any other official there, under the star-spangled banner, to carry on the work of "benevolent assimilation," the Filipinos were heroically contending for their independence, inspired by the declaration of independence proclaimed at Philadelphia 125 years ago.

As Senator Hoar, with a voice of flame, said in the senate, it was not the speech or the literature of anti-imperialists, or the cry of any others speaking in similar strain, that instigated the Filipinos to resist our arms, but our own example, our own teachings, line upon line, from the days of Sam Adams down to the hour when, through congress, we unanimously resolved "that the people of the island of Cuba were and of right ought to be free and independent."

What chaff, then, is all this talk about Bryan and Hoar, Boutwell and Schurz, and the host that say amen to their righteous protests, this talk about encouraging the Filipinos in their "rebellion!" Is it possible that anybody who litters the press with such rot supposes that the voice of liberty is to be thereby silenced in this land of Henry and Hancock, Sumner and Giddings, Channing and Lovejoy, and the great Emancipator who said: "They who deny freedom to others deserve it not themselves, and

under a just God cannot long retain it."

Nor would we pause without one other word. Gen. Grant—there is but one Gen. Grant whose voice we need heed nowadays—in the centennial year of 1875 made one of his little, but great speeches. It was made that year at Des Moines, Ia. In it he said: "Now, in this centennial year of our existence, I believe it a good time to begin to strengthen the foundations of the house commenced by our fathers 100 years ago at Concord and Lexington. Let us all labor to add all needful guarantees for the more perfect security of free thought, free speech and free press, of pure minds, unfettered religious sentiments, and of equal rights and privileges to all men, irrespective of nationality, color or religion."

Mighty words those!

Is there anything from first to last in our onslaught upon the inhabitants of the Philippine islands that tends to "strengthen the foundations of the house," to encourage "free thought, free speech and free press," or to promote "equal rights and privileges to all men irrespective of nationality, color or religion?" Will the son of the Gen. Grant, who so spoke, please ponder and answer.

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NEWS

President McKinley's colonial policy has been sustained by the supreme court of the United States. The decision was rendered on the 27th, in one of the Puerto Rico cases (see vol. iii., pp. 132, 152, 501, 578, 132, 162, 488, 501, 578, 628, 633, 641, 643, 647), which were argued last winter; and it definitely holds that the constitutional limitations upon the imposition of tariff duties do not control congress when legislating with reference to any part of the United States which is not a sovereign state in the union. This decision of the court was made by a majority of one judge. Those who held in that way were Justices Brown (republican), of Michigan, Gray (republican), of Massachusetts, Shiras (republican), of Pennsylvania, White (democrat), of Louisiana, and McKenna (republican), of California. The dissenting judges were Chief Justice Fuller (democrat), of Illinois, and Justices Harlan (republican), of Kentucky, Brewer (republican), of Kansas, and Peckham (democrat), of New York.

The true nature of this decision was not understood when the first news of the action of the court went over the wires. That news seemed to indicate clearly that the court had condemned the whole colonial policy by holding that immediately upon the ratification of the Spanish treaty Puerto Rico ceased to be foreign territory and became part of the United States. Further news was for a time confusing. It has since transpired that even the lawyers who were in the court, listening to the decisions as they were rendered, were perplexed. The explanation is that two of the decisions are in apparent conflict. One of them holds that the Dingley tariff did not apply to Puerto Rico after the treaty, because the Dingley tariff is a tariff on imports from foreign countries and immediately upon ratification of the treaty Puerto Rico ceased to be a foreign country. The other holds that congress may apply any tariff to Puerto Rico that it pleases, because, though Puerto Rico is not a foreign country, neither is it United States territory. The principal opinion in each of these apparently conflicting decisions was rendered by Justice Brown.

The former of the two cases is known as "the De Lima case." Duties under the Dingley tariff act had been levied on goods imported from Puerto Rico into the United States after the treaty with Spain, but before the Foraker act for the creation of a Puerto Rican government (see vol. iii., 9, 11, pp. 17, 21, 26, 27, 28, 35, 49, 57, 59, 268); and the importers, having paid these duties under protest, brought this suit to recover them, on the ground that Puerto Rico is not a foreign country. The government maintained, on the contrary, that the island was a foreign country for tariff purposes and must so remain until congress admits it into the American customs union. In this contention the government was defeated in this particular case. Justice Brown wrote the opinion of the court. In his opinion he rejected the government's theory, saying it "presupposes that a country may be domestic for one purpose and foreign for another;" that "territory may be held indefinitely by the United States; that it may be treated in every particular, except for tariff purposes, as domestic territory; that laws may be enacted and enforced by officers of the United States sent there for that purpose; that insurrections may be suppressed, wars carried on, revenues collected, taxes imposed; in short, that everything may be done which a government can do within its own boundaries, and yet that the territory may still remain a foreign country; that this state of things may continue for years, for a century even, but that until congress enacts otherwise it still remains a foreign country." Concluding that it would be "pure judicial legislation" to hold that this can be so, Justice Brown announced the decision of the court in these terms:

We are, therefore, of the opinion that at the time these duties were levied Puerto Rico was not a foreign country within the meaning of the tariff laws, but a territory of the United States, that the duties were illegally exacted, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover them back.

In that decision, Justice Brown was supported by Chief Justice Fuller, and by Justices Harlan, Brewer and Peckham. Justices McKenna, Shiras, White and Gray dissented. The objections of the first three dissenters, as stated by Justice McKenna, rested upon the proposition that the court is not driven to decide that Puerto Rico is either foreign or domestic territory; that a middle ground is open to it, and it may hold Puerto Rico to bear a relation to the United States as acquired territory which would justify the tariff duties involved in the case; but Justice Gray rested his dissent briefly upon a judicial precedent which he cited, and also upon a decision of the court agreed to by a majority of the justices and yet to be delivered.

The decision to which Justice Gray referred as yet to be delivered was made on the same day, soon after the decision in the "De Lima case." The case in which it was made is known as "the Downes case." In this case Justice Brown came over to the minority of the previous case, thereby raising it to the level of a majority, and apparently, and as some of the judges themselves said, reversing his previous decision. He also wrote the leading opinion in the second case. The second case, "the Downes case," was likewise to recover tariff duties