SIX

The New World of the Twenty-first Century: USDR

1. THE SEEDS OF THE FUTURE IN THE PAST

In the century in which two world wars changed the political landscape—the second more than the first an engagement of global extent—and in 1943, the darkest summer in the European theater of war, the summer of the siege of Stalingrad, I wrote a book entitled *How to Think About War and Peace.* [1]*

As I prepared in June to write that book, I asked myself the question, what had others thought about war and peace? I learned two things. First, I discovered that the journalists of the press and radio, the pundits, and even the statesmen, so misused the words "war" and "peace" that they blinded themselves to the realities of the matter. The phrase "cold war" had not yet come into circulation and without the insight that stems from that phrase, they clearly did not understand the intricacies of war and peace.

Second, I also discovered what I had not learned in college

*Endnotes for this chapter begin on page 266.

or in the early years of my teaching career, that the idea of world peace through world government was not of recent origin. In 1943, and in the few years immediately preceding, Walter Lippmann, John Foster Dulles, Clarence Streit, Sir Norman Angell, the reigning Pope, and others had mentioned world government as a remote and then unfeasible remedy for future world wars, but they did not appear to know that the idea of world government first emerged with Dante in the thirteenth century and that it had been developed in subsequent centuries by Charles Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, Thorstein Veblen, and others; nor did I know that until I had carefully examined the great books on the subject. [2]

In the almost fifty years that have elapsed since 1943, I joined the World Federalists and campaigned for world government; I was appointed by President Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago to his Committee to Frame a World Constitution, established by him immediately after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; I conducted a seminar for the Ford Foundation on war and peace, world peace, and world government in 1951; and I wrote two books (*The Common Sense of Politics*, 1971, and *A Vision of the Future*, 1984), in which these subjects are treated with a maturity acquired by years of thinking about them. [3]

I have placed in Appendix 1, with brief comments, eloquent statements relevant to the meanings of the words "war" and "peace." These, when understood, show that in the present world of international affairs there are only three possible relationships, one of which does not yet exist.

I have placed in Appendix 2 a sampling of expressions of the idea and ideal of perpetual world peace and its implementation through world government, beginning with Dante in the thirteenth century and coming down to John Strachey in 1963.

I recommend to readers that they read carefully both of

these appendixes as preparation for reading my own brief summary of the matter in the following sections of this essay.

Section 2 will be concerned with the fundamental understanding of war and peace, and with the clarification of current misconceptions about them.

Section 3 will briefly summarize the argument for world government as both the necessary and sufficient condition of permanent world peace. It will also deal with the possibility, the probability, and the desirability of world government.

Section 4 will deal with the major obstacles to world government, the most serious of which may be overcome in the last decade of this century by the steps being taking by the technologically advanced nations to approach homogeneity in their political institutions and in their economic arrangements. [4]

Finally, in Section 5, I will close with a vision of the new world of the twentieth century, in which the conflict between the two great superpowers—the USA and its NATO allies vs. the USSR and its Warsaw Pact satellites—will be replaced by the USDR (a union of socialist democratic republics). This will be a penultimate stage of progress toward a truly global world federal union that will eliminate the remaining potentially threatening conflict between the have and the have-not nations. [5]

2. THE UNDERSTANDING OF WAR AND PEACE

Journalistically, popularly, and academically, the words "war" and "peace" are used with meanings that do not account for all the realities of the matter. To think adequately and clearly about the relationships involved, we must distinguish between two meanings of the word "peace" and, correspondingly, two meanings of the word "war."

We say that the United States is currently at peace with its adjacent neighbors, Canada and Mexico; that it is also at

peace with England, Iran, and the Soviet Union. When we speak thus, we are using the word "peace" negatively to mean the absence of actual fighting—no use of military force in any kind of military engagement. It is only in this negative sense that we speak of international peace.

We might qualify this negative meaning of the word "peace" by adding that Canada and England are friendly nations in their relation to the United States; that Iran is hostile; and that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, which for many years of this century was hostile, has now become friendly, though both countries still persist in trying to achieve something like a balance of military power, which is not the case in the relation of Canada or England to the United States.

This difference in the relation between friendly and hostile nations—nations that are at peace in the sense of *not* being engaged in actual military action against each other—clearly affects the conduct of their foreign policies and the actions of their diplomats. As the great German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz observed in his book *On War*, it is only when the diplomats fail to serve the interests of their countries about seriously disputed issues that the military take over, to carry out the foreign policies in which the diplomats could not succeed.

In sharp contrast to this purely negative meaning of the word "peace," there is the positive meaning of the word when we use it to say that peace exists among the citizens of the United States, a peace that is breached by criminal actions of all sorts and by all acts of violence or terrorism. What do we have in mind when we use the word "peace" in this other way?

We mean much more than just the absence of military action. That kind of peace did not exist among the people of the United States when in the last century the citizens of its Northern and Southern states engaged in a bitter civil war with one another. It is most unlikely that anything like that

internecine strife will ever occur again in this country. Since then the people of our fifty states have lived peacefully with one another in the sense that all the disputes or quarrels that may arise between one state and another can be settled without resort to the violence of military action. How? By the action of our federal judiciary and our federal legislature.

In short, when constitutional and legal means for settling all disputes are available and effective between the states of a federal union such as ours, the people live at peace with one another—a peace not threatened by the seriousness of the quarrels that may break out among them.

The same kind of peace exists in each of the states of our federal union; not only in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and California, but also in the great cities of those states—in Boston, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. There, too, it is not the absence of serious disputes or quarrels that constitutes such peace, but the presence of judicial and legislative remedies for effectively settling issues without having to resort to the use of force, violence, or fighting in order to do so. The disputes or quarrels can be settled by speech, by voting, by available political means, by all the resources of civil government that, according to the great German jurist Hans Kelsen, exercises a monopoly of authorized force when it exercises its police powers to enforce the judgments of its courts or its legislative enactments.

To remember the difference between (a) the negative meaning of "peace" that is merely the absence of military action between states that have foreign policies and engage in diplomacy to carry them out, and (b) the positive meaning of the word when we say that people living in civil society under civil government are at peace with one another, let us always call the latter state of affairs "civil peace." Where civil peace exists, as in the United States, in California, or in Los Angeles, it is established and preserved by civil government.

How do we use the word "war" in senses corresponding to the negative and positive meanings of "peace" that we

have just noted? In the War of 1812, England made war upon the United States, a war that was settled by a so-called peace treaty. With that one exception, England and the United States have been at peace with one another, but only in the negative sense of no actual warfare between them, not in the positive sense that all serious disputes between them can be settled by diplomatic means and without recourse to the violence of military action. Being completely sovereign states, they have only diplomacy or warfare as means for settling disputes. Both are members of the United Nations, but that is not an effective civil government with either the authority or the power to settle serious disputes among its members.

The positive sense of the word "war" signifies actual warfare—the kind of military engagement that occurred between England and the United States in 1812. But the word also has a negative sense in which it connotes the absence of civil peace between states, especially those hostile to one another, when they have no means of settling their disputes without resort to actual warfare after all diplomatic efforts fail to do so.

As readers will discover by examining Appendix 1, the great writers of the past about war and peace used the phrase "state of war" to distinguish the negative sense of the word "war" from the positive sense in which it signifies actual warfare. They maintained that a state of war always exists among human beings living in what they called "a state of nature," by which they mean living anarchically—not in civil society under civil government. Even when they concede that there may never have been a time on earth when human beings lived in a state of nature, they call our attention to the fact that sovereign princes and sovereign states that are not federated are always in a state of nature in relation to one another (or, what is the same, in a state of war), because when serious disputes occur and diplomatic measures fail to resolve them, the only option left is fighting—actual warfare.

As Cicero, Machiavelli, and Locke point out in amazingly

parallel statements, when disputes cannot be settled by talk or law (which are the means available to human beings but not to brutes), the only option remaining is to employ the methods of the jungle (see Appendix 1).

The use of the phrase "cold war" to designate the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union during much of this century shows that we have learned to use the word "war" for a relationship between hostile sovereign states that is neither one of civil peace nor one of actual warfare. This indicates that the negative meaning of the word "peace" (that is, the absence of actual warfare) is, in the case of hostile nations, identical with the state of affairs described by the phrases "cold war" or "state of war." That peace is negative in two senses: it is not only the absence of actual warfare; it is also the absence of civil peace. It is a state of affairs intermediate between actual warfare and civil peace.

As such, it is the only peace that has ever existed between sovereign princes or sovereign states, whether they happen to be friendly or hostile. There never has been international peace in any sense except this purely negative meaning of the word "peace" (see Appendix 1).

3. THE NECESSITY OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT FOR CIVIL PEACE

When the difference between civil peace and international peace—between peace in the positive sense and peace in the negative sense—is fully understood, the argument for civil world government as necessary for world civil peace can be stated in a few unquestionable propositions.

Disarmament, partial or complete, does not and cannot preserve or perpetuate peace between sovereign nations that have been or have become hostile. It cannot do so because the only peace that exists between sovereign states, especially nations that are hostile, is one that involves conflicting foreign policies and the attempts of diplomacy to resolve matters at

issue. As we have seen, when diplomacy fails, and the matters at issue are regarded as crucial to national interests, military action is inevitable. When conversations completely break down, fighting begins.

In any community in which civil peace is present, government is necessary not only to prevent recourse to violence as a means for settling quarrels, because the existence of government makes law and talk available as effective nonviolent means. Government is also necessary to decide matters of policy and of conduct concerning which reasonable persons can disagree, even such simple matters as the regulation of traffic. In any community, small or large, if driving on the left or right side of the road and a safe speed of driving were not regulated by law and were left instead to the decision of differing individuals, pandemonium would result and the civil peace of that community would be shattered.

Here, then, are the unquestionable propositions, referred to above, that constitute the nerve of the argument for the necessity of world civil government to preserve and perpetuate world civil peace. They are all hypothetical propositions.

1. *If* civil government is necessary for civil peace in any organized community, small or large—in villages, towns, and metropolitan municipalities, and in sovereign states, either independent states or states that are members of a federal union—*then* civil government is necessary for civil peace in that largest of all possible communities, the global community that includes all the peoples on earth.

2. *If* world civil government is necessary for world civil peace, *then* it must also be *possible* to unite all the sovereign states that now exist in a federal union, in which those states would relinquish their external sovereignty (namely, their power to engage in diplomacy with one another, to engage in warfare, and to contract treaties) while retaining their internal sovereignty (as do the fifty states in the federal union that is the United States of America). The categorical proposition implicit in this hypothetical proposition asserts that what is necessary cannot be impossible.

3. *If* world civil government is possible, then a world cultural community must also be possible. That possibility is quite compatible with the continued existence of pluralism with regard to diverse languages and ethnic diversity in customs and conventions, in mythologies and religions, and in all matters about which reasonable men and women may reasonably disagree. The only things that now prevail which would be precluded by world government from continuing to exist are foreign policies, diplomacy, military installations and personnel, customs and immigration barriers, and the existence of persons called foreigners.

The rule of logic applicable to hypothetical propositions is that affirmation of the antecedent clause, the *if* clause, entails affirmation of the consequent clause, the *then* clause. Denial of the consequent entails denial of the antecedent.

Those who argue against the possibility of world civil peace and the possibility of a global civil government, concluding that neither is necessary, tend to confuse the possible and the probable. To say that something is unlikely or improbable is not to say that it is impossible.

When we consider all the obstacles and difficulties that must be overcome in order to constitute a world federal union and to establish world civil peace, we are led to make different estimates of the probability that world civil government can be established at some foreseeable time in the future; but whether those estimates are short-term or long-term in no way affects the possibility of its occurrence, and certainly not the necessity of it.

At various times in the last fifty years, in arguing for the necessity and possibility of world federal government, I have made different estimates of the probability of its occurrence. When I wrote *How to Think About War and Peace* in 1942, I predicted that we might establish world government in 500 years. That was before the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After that, the desirability of establishing world federal government to prevent a thermonuclear holocaust, which might make a large portion of the

globe uninhabitable, shortened my prediction to 300 years or less. In the sixties and seventies, as the cold war between the US and USSR intensified and the two superpowers strove to exceed each other in building nuclear weapons, that prediction was further shortened.

In the last decade, though the threat of a thermonuclear holocaust diminished, the threat of irreversible damage to the environment, which might make the planet inhospitable to life, increased. The need for world civil government to prevent that from happening has still further shortened the time in which it must be established in order to deal effectively with the viability of this planet as a dwelling place for the human race.

All these considerations affect different estimates of the desirability and probability of world government, but have no bearing on its necessity or possibility. It remains possible without being probable at any time in the foreseeable future. It can also be necessary for world civil peace without also being sufficiently desirable to motivate human beings to pay the price for it and to make the effort to surmount all the obstacles and difficulties that stand in the way of its establishment.

There are many arguments concerning the desirability and undesirability of world civil government. In the opinion of many, all governments are necessary evils. World government, in their view, would be the worst of such necessary evils, not to mention its undesirability in terms of the surrender of national sovereignty to constitute a world federal union.

Readers will find these arguments, pro and con, considered in Appendixes 3 and 4, where they will also find much more ample statements of the argument for the necessity of world civil government to establish world civil peace, which has been briefly summarized here in three hypothetical propositions.

The establishment of world civil government at some future time may preclude the occurrence of the kind of inter-

national warfare that from the beginning of independent sovereign states has always existed on earth. But it does not preclude the possibility of a war between the states of a world federal union, something like the war between the Northern and Southern states that, in the history of the United States, is often called a civil war.

However, that war did not end with a peace treaty, but with a declaration of amnesty, which restored the civil peace that had been sundered. When international wars end with peace treaties, the peace established by those treaties is the negative peace of a truce. [6] The fighting ceases, but the diplomats go to work again and the military prepare for the next outbreak of warfare when the diplomats fail.

It has been said that if world government were to come about, it would eventuate either through world conquest or through a world constitutional convention. Only the latter would serve the purpose of world peace. Government must be constitutional, not despotic, if it is to be the indispensable condition of peace.

In any community ruled despotically, insurrection and rebellion are forever brewing among those who are oppressed by the injustice of the despot. [7] The peace of the community is fragile and perishable. If world civil peace is to be stable and perpetual, the world government required for its establishment must be constitutional, not despotic. A military conquest of the world by a superpower, ending in despotic world government, could not establish stable and perpetual world civil peace.

4. THE FOUR MAJOR OBSTACLES TO WORLD GOVERNMENT

Of the four major obstacles to world government, two have been overcome or are now in the process of being overcome. Two still remain to be surmounted. They are the most obdurate and intractable.

In the long march toward world government until this

century, a major obstacle was the size of the global community. It appeared to be ungovernable. But the technological advances made in the twentieth century, especially in travel and communication time, have shrunk the size of the globe to an extent less than the travel and communication time that prevailed in the eighteenth century among the thirteen independent states on the Atlantic seaboard of this country. After the Philadelphia convention in 1787, the anti-Federalists argued that the domain for which a federal constitution was being drafted and was submitted to the people for adoption was too large to be governable.

Until very recently, as recently as the closing months of 1989 and the succeeding months of 1990, another serious obstacle remained, one that appeared to be insurmountable. Once again our own experience in constitutional construction helps us to define the character of this second obstacle. The opening clause of Section 4 of Article IV of the Constitution reads as follows: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of Government. . . ." This applies not only to the thirteen states that were called upon to ratify or reject the Constitution as drafted; it also applied in the future to any of the Western territories that would apply for admission to the federal union.

The significance of this clause is that it calls for political homogeneity of the states comprising the union. If the national government of the federal union is to be a republican, which is to say a constitutional, form of government, its member states must also be constitutional in their forms of government. What is being rejected as unfeasible is political heterogeneity, some of the federating states being constitutional in their form of government, while others were despotic—governments by might rather than by right, governments with force but without authority derived from the consent of the governed.

The economic homogeneity of the federating states did not even have to be mentioned, because in the eighteenth

century all the states had agrarian, preindustrial economies, with private ownership of the farmlands, of hand tools and simple machines, and of beasts of burden, including chattel slaves in the Southern states.

In the middle years of the twentieth century, the technologically advanced, industrial countries of what came to be called the First and Second worlds were both politically and economically heterogeneous in radically opposing respects. On the one hand, the private property, capital-intensive economies of nations that were politically democratic in varying degrees formed one bloc of nations. On the other hand, capital-intensive economies of the countries in which all capital was owned by totalitarian states that were governed despotically formed another bloc of nations. This radical heterogeneity, both political and economic, so long as it persisted, would have remained an insurmountable obstacle to a federal union that included the states of the First and Second worlds.

That obstacle is now being surmounted and there is every reason to hope and believe that it will be more and more effectively surmounted in the decade immediately ahead. As pointed out in Endnote 13 to the first chapter of this book, the technologically advanced industrialized countries either are or are becoming democratic republics. They also either are or are becoming free-enterprise market economies, with private ownership of capital.

What once was a conflict between antagonistic governments and economies, radically heterogeneous, is now moving toward fraternal and cooperative relationships among states that are or are becoming politically and economically homogeneous. What once was an unbridgeable chasm between the First and Second worlds promises to become a new First World order in the next century, with no inherent obstacle to the membership of these states in a federal union.

The despotically ruled oil-producing countries of the Arabic and Islamic Middle East have now become a Second World in conflict with the First and the technologically re-

tarded, insufficiently industrialized countries have now become a Third World. Many or most of them are also democracies in name only or are despotically governed. Here is the political and economic heterogeneity that remains an obstacle to global world government and remains to be surmounted.

It is still too early to outline the ways and steps by which to overcome this third major obstacle to world civil peace through world civil government. A federal union including all the states in the First World may have to precede the solution of this problem; for it may be that only by the united action of these states can conflict, and even possible warfare, between the have and the have-not nations be avoided or ameliorated. The difficult problem to be solved is complicated by the fact that 75 percent of the world's population live, or merely subsist, in the have-not nations, and it is there that population increase is on the rise.

A whole world of haves without have-nots, both political and economic haves, may look like an utterly impracticable utopian dream, even to those who are persuaded that it is feasible to socialize private-property capitalism more completely and to make democracy more effective than it now is in the technologically advanced, industrialized nations of the new First World.

Finally, we come to the fourth and most intractable of the four major obstacles to a world civil government by a global federal union. It is most intractable because it is the only one of the four major obstacles that is entirely emotional and irrational.

Of the three others, two are either now solved or are in the process of being solved and one is subject to rational consideration. But thinking about this fourth obstacle can do no good, for those whose emotions generate it are deaf to the voice of reason and blind to the necessity and desirability of world civil peace.

Everywhere in the world we now see resurgent nationalism rampant, filled with the passion for preserving ancient

ethnic identities, with virulent racial prejudices and hatreds, with passion for the illusory purity of bloodlines that must be protected against infection by outsiders. This rising tribalism and ethnocentrism in Europe, in the Near East, in Africa, in India and Pakistan, and in the Far East involves what appears to be an incurable xenophobia, an inveterate attachment to locality, an emotional provincialism or parochialism that is totally incompatible with thinking about the need to abandon the external sovereignty of independent states in order for them to enter into a federal union, not to mention their taking actual steps to do so. As Arnold Toynbee observed, it was this inveterate attachment to locality that frustrated the efforts of the Delian League to resolve the issues that, unresolved, lead to the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century B.C.

5. THE MOTIVATION NEEDED TO OVERCOME THE EMOTIONAL OBSTACLE

When the opening papers of *The Federalist* argued for the ratification by the citizens of New York of the constitution that had been drafted at the convention in Philadelphia, they gave what they thought were two compelling reasons for doing so. The first was that without federal union, actual warfare between the states could not be prevented; in fact, hostilities were at that time brewing between New York and New Jersey about rights to the waterways that separated them and about commerce between them. [8]

Their second argument, which they thought might be even more persuasive, was the common defense of the eastern seaboard from invasion from abroad. The thirteen independent states, by surrendering their external sovereignty to form a federal union, would be better able to secure themselves from subjugation by a foreign power than each of them alone could effect.

These two reasons proved to be sufficiently persuasive to

overcome the emotional obstacles (which operated less stringently than they are operating in the world today) to preserve the separate identity of local groups and their inveterate attachment to locality. The prevention of war between the states and protection from conquest from outside was sufficient motivation for the people of the thirteen former British colonies to pay the price they had to pay for peace and national security.

Peace—not merely the absence of fighting, but civil peace where there are are effective means for settling disputes without diplomacy or military action—is an ideal state of affairs toward which human beings, for the most part, aspire, or to which they at least pay lip service as a desirable goal. But when they count the costs of actually establishing such peace to replace the anarchy of sovereign states and the state of nature and of war between them that such anarchy maintains, most human beings find themselves emotionally unwilling to pay the price. That is increasingly evident in the world today.

What motivation is needed for the peoples of the world —both in the new First World and in the new Second World—to overcome their emotional reluctance or even passionate resistance to move in the direction of world civil government? What will make them willing to pay the price for it?

Fortunately or unfortunately, there is no threat of invasion from outer space to impel them to unite for the common defense of this planet. The threat of a thermonuclear holocaust that would create an unlivable nuclear winter on most of this planet's surface has now dwindled. With these two threats nonexistent or lessened as motivations for overcoming the emotional impediments to thinking about and acting for peace on earth, is there any threat that can operate with sufficient force?

Yes, a threat that has emerged with growing awareness in the last half of this century. It is the threat of irreversible damage to the environment that will make this planet inhos-

pitable to human life. To operate as it should to overcome worldwide emotional reluctance and resistance, that threat must be clearly understood and emotionally felt by more and more of the world's peoples, in the have-not as well as in the have nations.

Not only is this less likely to occur in the have-not nations, but it must also be recognized that, if the have-not nations must speedily industralize in order to become socialist democracies, their industrialization will itself hasten the deterioration of the environment to the point where irreversible lethal changes will occur. In other words, the time it will take for the environmental threat to become effectively operative in both the have and the have-not nations will itself be shortened by the industrialization of the have-not nations.

Be that as it may, the threat of lethal environmental change is the only threat that can have the persuasive power to overcome the emotional obstacles that now are as raging and rampant as they have ever been in the past. It is a sad but true commentary on mankind that human beings may be compelled to do on their knees, groveling in despair, what they should do for sound reasons, upright and hopeful, by the exercise of their minds.

That all human beings participate in one and the same human nature and that the human mind is essentially the same everywhere on earth is the last, best hope for the fraternity among all the peoples of the earth that is needed for world civil peace through world civil government. All the differences that have arisen among human subgroups, ethnic or national, are of nurtural origin, and like all the cultural differences that remain, are superficial as compared with the profound sameness of human nature and the unity of the human mind.

The preceding chapter in this book, on human nature, nurture, and culture, explains the origin of the widespread twentieth-century error about the nonexistence of human nature along with the equally important mistake of regarding

the differences, especially the inequalities, between human subgroups as being natural, instead of being nurtural and, therefore, eradicable.

The twentieth century had seen three elements in human life and society become globally transcultural: technology and the mathematics and natural science that underlie it. Philosophy and religion are still not transcultural. However much one may hope that they, too, become transcultural if, like natural science, they claim logical and factual truth for themselves, their not ever becoming transcultural is not an impediment to global federal union.

We know this from the fact that, where smaller federal unions have come into existence and have endured, pluralism in the spheres of philosophy and religion have not been disruptive. Even with an irreducible pluralism in the spheres of philosophy and religion, a worldwide cultural community in technology, mathematics, and natural science may be a sufficient foundation for world civil government. It can come into being and endure with pluralism in all matters of taste about which human beings can reasonably differ without disputing, or in matters of public policy about which they can reasonably differ, engage in dispute, and resort to majority rule in order to settle their disputes. (See Appendix 5 on the vision of what is possible in the future.)

ENDNOTES

1. Published in New York in 1944.

2. See Chapter 2 of *How to Think About War and Peace.* After being defeated for the presidency by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie later made his world tour and wrote a best seller entitled *One World* (1943).

Here is a brief bibliography of the major works on the idea of world peace through world government.

Dante Alighieri: *On World Government or De Monarchia* (1310–13), New York, 1949.

Charles Saint-Pierre: *Scheme for Lasting Peace* (1739), London, 1939.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: *A Lasting Peace* (1756), London, 1917.

Immanuel Kant: *Perpetual Peace* (1795), New York, 1939.

Jeremy Bentham: *A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace* (1789), London, 1939.

Thorstein Veblen: *An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation*, London, 1917.

3. The Committee to Frame a World Constitution had the following membership:

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, Chancellor of the University of Chicago; Chairman of the Board of Editors of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*

G. A. BORGESE, Professor in the Division of the Humanities, University of Chicago; author of *Goliath*

MORTIMER J. ADLER, Professor of the Philosophy of Law, University of Chicago; Associate Editor of the *Great Books of the Western World*; author of *How to Think About War and Peace*

STRINGFELLOW BARR, former President of St. John's College

ALBERT LEON GUÉRARD, Professor Emeritus of General Literature, Stanford University; author of *Europe Free and United*

HAROLD A. INNIS, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto

ERICH KAHLER, Visiting Professor at Cornell University; author of *Man the Measure*

WILBER G. KATZ, Dean of the Law School, University of Chicago

CHARLES H. MCILWAIN, Professor Emeritus of Science of Government, Harvard University; author of *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* and *Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern*

ROBERT REDFIELD, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, member of the Board of the American Council on Race Relations

REXFORD GUY TUGWELL, Professor of Political Science, Uni-

versity of Chicago; former Governor of Puerto Rico; author of *Battle for Democracy*

An extensive excerpt from the preliminary draft of a world constitution, as written and published in 1947–48, will be found at the end of Appendix 2.

4. On this matter of political and economic homogeneity, see Endnote 13 attached to the first chapter in this book.

5. See ibid.

6. In his account of the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides tells us that the envoys from each country returned home and did not return again. Then at the opening of Book II of his history, he writes as follows:

> The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on either side now really begins. For now all [communication] except through the medium of heralds ceased, and hostilities were commenced and prosecuted without intermission (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Chapter 6).

The actual fighting was interrupted for a little more than twenty years. Thucydides refers to this period of time as a truce rather than as a period of peace, because both sides were then preparing to resume the military contest.

7. John Locke, in his *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, comments on the meaning of the word "rebellion" (*rebellare*). Those who transgress lawful civil government and rule despotically return to a state of war with their subjects (which is the literal meaning of the word *rebellare*).

In another place in his treatise, Locke adds the following statement:

> Whosoever uses force without right—as every one does in society who does it without law—puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it, and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor (John Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, Chapter XIX, Section 232).

Aquinas goes further. In his view, any injustice imposed by force renders a civil peace defective:

> For if one man enters into concord with another, not by a spontaneous will but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that threatens him, such concord is not really peace. . . . (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part II-II, Q. 29, A. 1, Reply 1).

> . . . there is no peace when a man agrees with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently, men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain a peace in which nothing is contrary to their will (Ibid., Q. 29, A. 2, Reply 2).

> [Hence] peace is the work of justice . . . insofar as justice removes the obstacles to peace (Ibid., Q. 29, A. 3, Reply 3).

8. In *The Federalist, No. 6*, Alexander Hamilton writes:

> To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

Appendix 1. On the Meanings of the Words "War" and "Peace"

Three strikingly parallel passages from Cicero, Machiavelli, and Locke:

> There are two ways of settling disputed questions; one by discussion, the other by force. The first being characteristic of man, the second of brutes, we should have recourse to the latter only if the former fails.
>
> —CICERO, *De Officiis*, bk. I, sec. XI, chap. 34 (44 B.C.)

> There are two ways of contesting, the one by law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts;

but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second.

—MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince*, chap. XVIII (1513)

There are two sorts of contests among men, the one managed by law, the other by force; and these are of such nature that where the one ends, the other always begins.

—JOHN LOCKE, *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1706)

In antiquity, Plato on war and peace:

. . . What men in general term peace would be . . . only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting.

—PLATO, *Laws*, I, 626 (5th century B.C.)

In modern times, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke on war and peace:

. . . It is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called *war*; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *time* is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is *peace*.

—THOMAS HOBBES, *Leviathan*, chap. XIII (1651)

. . . Though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and

guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war.

—THOMAS HOBBES, *Leviathan*, chap. XIII (1651)

War between two Powers is the result of a settled intention, manifested on both sides, to destroy the enemy State, or at least to weaken it by all means at their disposal. The carrying of this intention into act is war, strictly so called; so long as it does not take shape in act, it is only a state of war. . . . The state of war is the natural relation of one Power to another.

—JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, *A Lasting Peace* and *The State of War* (c. 1756)

Want of a common judge with authority puts all men in a state of Nature. . . . [If, in a state of nature, men fail to settle their differences by reason, they enter into a state of war which is the realm of force] or a declared design of force . . . where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief. . . .

—JOHN LOCKE, *Second Treatise Concerning Civil Government,* chap. XIX, sec. 19

[Writing about Saint-Pierre's scheme in his essay on *A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe* (1761), Rousseau argued for federation as the only way to procure such peace on the continent. We must admit, he declared,] that the powers of Europe stand to each other strictly in a state of war, and that all the separate treaties between them are in the nature of a temporary truce rather than a real peace. [This is due to the fact that the only] recognized method of settling disputes between one prince and another [is] the appeal to the sword; a method inseparable from the state of anarchy and war, which necessarily springs from the absolute independence conceded to all sovereigns under the imperfect conditions now prevailing in Europe.

—JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, *A Lasting Peace* (c. 1756)

Emery Reves and E.B. White on the misuse of the words "war" and "peace" in the twentieth century:

All those brief respites from war which we called "peace" were nothing but diplomatic, economic, political, and financial wars

between the various groups of men called "nations," with the only distinction that these conflicts, rivalries, and hostilities have been fought out with all the means except actual shooting.

—EMERY REVES, *A Democratic Manifesto*, p. 64 (1942)

Nothing is more frightening than to hear what is not law called law, what is not peace called peace. . . . To speak as though we had peace when what we've got is treaties and pacts, to use the word "peace" for non-peace, is to lessen our chance of ever getting world peace, since the first step toward getting it is to realize with dazzling clearness that we haven't got it and never have had it.

—E. B. WHITE, "Talk of the Town,"
The New Yorker, May 6, 1943

Appendix 2. On World Peace Through World Government

In the 13th century, Dante in *On World-Government, or De Monarchia*:

Wherever there can be contention, there judgment should exist; otherwise things would exist imperfectly, without their own means of adjustment or correction, which is impossible, since in things necessary, God or Nature is not defective. Between any two governments, neither of which is in any way subordinate to the other, contention can arise either through their own fault or that of their subjects. This is evident. Therefore there should be judication between them. And since neither can know the affairs of the other, not being subordinated (for among equals there is no authority), there must be a third and wider power which can rule both within its own jurisdiction. This third power is either the world-government or it is not. If it is, we have reached our conclusion; if it is not, it must in turn have its equal outside its jurisdiction, and then it will need a third party as judge, and so *ad infinitum*, which is impossible. So we

must arrive at a first and supreme judge for whom all contentions are judiciable either directly or indirectly; and this will be our world-governor or emperor. Therefore, world-government is necessary for the world.

—DANTE ALIGHIERI, *De Monarchia*, bk. I, chap. 10 (c. 1313)

World-government . . . must be understood in the sense that it governs mankind on the basis of what all have in common and that by a common law it leads all toward peace. This common norm or law should be received by local governments in the same way that practical intelligence in action receives its major premises from the speculative intellect. To these it adds its own particular minor premises and then draws particular conclusions for the sake of its action. These basic norms not only can come from a single source, but must do so in order to avoid confusion among universal principles. Moses himself followed this pattern in the law which he composed, for, having chosen the chiefs of the several tribes, he left them the lesser judgments, reserving to himself alone the higher and more general. These common norms were then used by the tribal chiefs according to their special needs. Therefore, it is better for mankind to be governed by one, not by many; and hence by a single governor, the world ruler; and if it is better, it is pleasing to God, since He always wills the better. And when there are only two alternatives—the better is also the best, and is consequently not only pleasing to God, but the choice of "one" rather than "many" is what most pleases Him. Hence it follows that mankind lives best under a single government, and therefore that such a government is necessary for the well-being of the world.

—DANTE ALIGHIERI, *De Monarchia*, bk. I, chap. 14

. . . The proper work of mankind taken as a whole is to exercise continually its entire capacity for intellectual growth, first, in theoretical matters, and, secondarily, as an extension of theory in practice. [This function] cannot be achieved by a single man, or family, or neighborhood, or city, or state, [but only by] the whole of mankind as an organized multitude. . . . [Therefore],

to achieve this state of universal well-being, a single world-government is necessary.

—DANTE ALIGHIERI, *De Monarchia*, bk. I, chaps. 3–5

Comment on Immanuel Kant's essay "Perpetual Peace" (1795), excerpted from the *Syntopicon* chapter on War and Peace:

Not only does Kant definitely dismiss the notion of a world union formed along American lines, but even that less perfect union of states which would have the form of a "*Permanent Congress of Nations*" seems to him an impracticable idea in the world as it is at the end of the eighteenth century. "With the too great extension of such a Union of States over vast regions," he writes, "any government of it, and consequently the protection of its individual members, must at last become impossible; and thus a multitude of such corporations would again bring round a state of war."

Nevertheless, Kant refuses to yield completely to this conclusion. "The morally practical reason," he affirms, "utters within us its irrevocable *Veto: 'There shall be no War.'* . . . Hence the question no longer is as to whether Perpetual Peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must *act* on the supposition of its being real. We must work for what may perhaps not be realized . . . and thus we may put an end to the evil of wars, which have been the chief interest of the internal arrangements of all States without exception."

And in his *Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmo-Political Plan*, Kant does more than urge upon us our moral duty to work for perpetual peace as prerequisite to "the highest political good." He engages in prophecy. He pictures the nations of the world "after many devastations, overthrows, and even complete internal exhaustion of their powers" as "driven forward to the goal which Reason might well have impressed upon them, even without so much sad experience. This is none other than the

advance out of the lawless state of savages and the entering into a Federation of Nations. . . . However visionary this idea may appear to be . . . it is nevertheless the inevitable issue of the necessity in which men involve one another."

John Strachey on democracy and world government:

A Conclusion

My conclusion is, then, that while democracy is no cure-all, it will prove to be the political system of the future. It is no cure-all, first because it is not yet applicable to large parts of the world and, second, because, even if it were, it would still fail, in itself, to solve some of the more acute problems of our period.

Nevertheless, democracy is the political system of the future, because it is by far the best way—in the long run the only tolerable way—of managing complex, highly developed societies made up of well-educated people, capable of taking part in public affairs. As these societies are the most powerful and influential, they will set the pace for the rest of the world.

But this is to look at democracy in a utilitarian, cold-blooded sort of way. Democracy is not only the most practical way of running up-to-date communities. It is much more than that. It is the only political system which recognises the ultimate worth of every human being: which gives expression to the conviction that behind and beyond all the enormous inequalities, in education, in opportunity, and perhaps in innate ability, which today distinguish one man from another, there is yet an ultimate equivalence between all men, as men. Democracy gives expression to the conviction that no one of us, and certainly no government, is fit to say that one man is inherently better than another. In a word, democracy is a political system for free men instead of slaves.

World Democracy

Democracy is simply the best way yet discovered of arranging the affairs of advanced modern societies. It is not a potential

solution to the human problem, for there is none. For we had better learn to be modest in the demands we make on human institutions. One of my favourite quotations on democracy is a saying of old Churchill's: "Democracy," he used to say, stumping his way down the lobbies of the House of Commons, "democracy is the worst form of government in the world, except for all the others. . . ."

There is another reason why democracy is not in itself a cure-all. Even if all the existing states in the world could become effectively functioning democracies, which they can't, this would not in itself be enough. This is because a world of a hundred or more democratic states would still be a world of *states*; a world of *sovereign* states; and it is my considered opinion that sovereign states will not do in the nuclear age. This form of human organisation will not secure the survival of the human race in the desperate epoch in which we live.

This raises the whole question of democracy and war. War—the prevention of war—is the supreme question of our epoch. This is a far more cogent issue than whether we should organise our economic life on capitalist or socialist lines. After all, experience is showing that peoples can survive under either capitalism or socialism; but they cannot survive under nuclear war.

Writing as a life-long socialist, I must say that there is no question on which, looking back, we socialists have suffered more disillusion than on this question of war. I think that all socialists, whether of the left or the right, whether crusty old Social Democrats like myself, or active Communists, once believed, to a greater or lesser extent, that the essential cause of war lay in the economic rivalries of capitalist states. From this diagnosis of the causes of war arose the belief that once capitalism had been abolished and society organized on a socialist basis, the cause of war would have been removed and the establishment of world peace would be easy enough. I do not see how this argument can be maintained any longer.

We have now had 45 years' experience of the world policies of a major socialist society, the Soviet Union. And now we have had 14 years' experience of the behaviour of another vast country, organising its economic life on ultra-socialist lines, China.

What is their record on this supreme issue of peace and war? I am not one of those who allege that the socialist countries have been more warlike or aggressive than the capitalist countries. I think it is wrong to assert that Russia is determined to make the world Communist by means of military conquest. What is true is that the Russian Government believes that one day the whole world will be Communist; and it also believed, at any rate until recently, that war was by no means a thing of the past. But what is more important than the exact belief of the men who form governments, is the record of what they do. And, by and large, I would say that the record of the Communist countries, since they have come into existence, is neither worse nor better than the rest of us in the matter of peace and war. Russia has often been aggressive, in Finland, in Hungary, in annexing the Baltic states and on other occasions. But so have we in the West: at Suez, for example, in the case of my own country, Britain.

But this, for a socialist, is a profoundly depressing conclusion. It suggests that there is no solution for our overwhelmingly important problem of the maintenance of peace in the nuclear age by means of transforming our societies along socialist lines. Socialism is desirable in itself: I am convinced that it is. But there is no evidence that it will solve the problem of peace and war. China was recently engaged in a most wanton aggression against India, a Communist country attacking a semi-socialist country. It is really no longer open to socialists to claim that they have found the solution to the problem of the maintenance of peace. If they do so, they make a laughing-stock of themselves.

The Economic Causes of War

What was wrong, then, with the socialist diagnosis of the economic causes of war? I am still as convinced as ever I was that the original purpose of wars of conquest was predominantly economic. In the ancient world, in the world of the great slave empires—Assyria, Egypt, Rome, and the like—the purpose of conquest was essentially to enslave the conquered peoples and then exploit their labour. Either you physically took them and

transported them to your own country as slaves and set them to work, as the Romans did on their great landed estates, or you left them in their own country and then, by one device or another, you took away from them almost everything they produced above subsistence.

After all, in the ancient world with its very low level of productivity, the only way in which the leisured class could live in luxury was to acquire an abundant supply of slave (or semi-slave) labour by means of conquest. However, that was all a long time ago. Nevertheless, socialists believed that by a different mechanism, the wars of capitalist society were still essentially economic. Lenin put forward his theory of the causation of war in his book *Imperialism*. He believed that capitalist societies must attack each other in order to expand and secure markets and spheres of investment. If they did not do so, they would stifle in their own "plethora of capital" and overproduced consumer goods. Every major capitalist society, Lenin taught, was a sort of pressure-cooker which sooner or later must burst out on the rest of the world or stifle.

Now I still believe that this thesis of Lenin's had a very large measure of truth in it, at any rate for the type of capitalism which existed when he wrote in 1917. It was true that this kind of capitalism, of which the essential characteristic was that the wage-earning masses were held down at near subsistence level, could only expand into the outside world. It had to seek its markets and its fields of investment outside itself because its own internal market was so limited by the poverty of the vast majority of its people. But all this is demonstrably no longer true of contemporary capitalist society. As I have noted previously, there is no doubt at all about the fact that they are able to, and actually have, raised steadily the standard of life of their wage-earning masses. And this of course has provided them with an ever-expanding internal market which made external expansion unnecessary.

Lenin's Opinion

Curiously enough Lenin noticed this possibility. But he dismissed it as something which, if it could be done, would no

doubt solve the problem, but which capitalism was inherently incapable of doing. In a little-noticed passage in Chapter 4 of his book *Imperialism* Lenin said quite clearly that *if* capitalism *could* raise the standard of life of the wage-earning masses and develop agriculture, then the outward pressure toward limitless expansion would be relieved. The capitalist powers would no longer need to collide with each other in bloody war.

Now there is no denying the fact that during the last 20 years, capitalism has done precisely these two things. It *has* developed agriculture and it *has* raised the standard of life of the masses in capitalist countries. It is still doing both of these things. Therefore, according to Lenin's argument, it is no longer capitalism. In fact there are economists who say that the economic system as it exists in the Western countries today has been so greatly changed by the reforms and modifications of the last 20 years that it cannot any longer really be called "capitalist." I think this is wrong; I think that the Western countries are still most conveniently classified as capitalist societies. What has been shown is that with limited, but important, changes capitalism can do precisely the two things which Lenin said it could never do. (As you will note we are back by another road at the fundamental question of Marx's forecast of the ever-increasing misery of the wage-earners. It is the fact that this forecast has been disproved which changes everything.)

No Inevitabilities

I conclude from all this that war is no longer inevitable between capitalist societies; they can manage all right while keeping the peace. But unfortunately this does not mean that they necessarily *will* keep the peace. Socialist societies, of course, are under no necessity to undertake aggression and expansion: they can occupy themselves indefinitely in raising the standard of life of their peoples, and with development in general. But, equally, experience shows that this is no guarantee that they *will*, in fact, abstain from aggression. For what are the Chinese armies doing on the southern slopes of the Himalayas? China, surely, on any rational calculation, should be devoting every ounce of her energies and resources to her desperate task of internal

development. But, on the contrary, she sent some 14 divisions to attack India.

From this I conclude that all one can say about the causes of war is something simpler and more general than we socialists had supposed. The cause of war seems to be simply the existence of separate sovereign states, whether capitalist, socialist, feudal, or any other kind. It is the fact that the world is organised, or rather disorganised, into over one hundred sovereign states that is the cause of war.

Are Democracies Pacific?

I have gone into this whole question of the disillusionment which socialists have suffered on this issue of the economic causes of war in order to avoid a new disillusionment that I think democrats may well suffer unless they take care. Democrats are often accustomed to argue that the cause of war lies in tyrannies, autocracies, or other forms of arbitrary dictatorship, and that if only all the states of the world would become democracies, all governments would be pacific and there would be no danger of war. I am afraid that experience will show, if such a state of things as a world of democratic states ever comes into existence, that this belief in the inherent pacifism of democracies is also an illusion. I do indeed believe that democracies are, on the whole, rather less aggressive and bellicose than tyrannies, autocracies, or other forms of arbitrary government. A government which is responsible to its electors does, from time to time at any rate, experience pressures for peace. But I am afraid that it is far from true that democracies are always and completely pacific. On the contrary, a majority of democratic electors sometimes suffers moods in which it is unreasonable and bellicose. If we study the history of, say, the last 100 years, in which alone we can find states with democratic governments in the sense in which I have been using the words, it will not, alas, be difficult to find examples in which undoubtedly democratic states have been aggressive and bellicose. You will readily call to mind examples of this in the case of Britain. Most left-wing people, at any rate, consider that the United States today is a rather aggressive country. Yet undoubtedly the

United States Government is one of the most effectively functioning democracies in the world. I do not myself think that America is specially aggressive but I agree that she is not absolutely, or even particularly, pacific either.

No, a world of democratic states would still be a world subject to war. The most that we can claim for such a world would be that it would be less likely to go to war than a world of states ruled by arbitrary, autocratic governments. Unless we face these unpleasant facts we shall, I think, suffer an analogous disillusionment with democracy to that which socialists have suffered over this question of peace and war.

Is War Inevitable?

War, then, would still be possible in a world of democratic states. In fact I am afraid that I must go further than this and say that, in the long run, war would be inevitable in a world of separate sovereign, democratic states. It might be postponed for a long time. Indeed I believe that the series of crises through which the world is passing at the present time—Cuba, Berlin, Vietnam, the Indo-Chinese conflict, to name a few—are by no means so immediately dangerous as many people think. I do not think that it is at all likely that, say, the next, or the next but one, of these crises will precipitate us into a world nuclear war and so blot us out. Nevertheless how can we deny that if the world goes on living like this: if crisis succeeds crisis in endless succession, sooner of later one of them *will* erupt into world nuclear war?

After all, we are living in an international anarchy. There is no power whatever superior to the sovereign state today. That is the essence of sovereignty. And anarchy has its own laws. They are statistical laws and for that very reason they are not subject to human control, but they are subject to human calculation and forecast. So we can forecast only too confidently that if you leave a state of anarchy in existence indefinitely, it will, sooner or later, erupt into conflict—or else all historical experience is at fault.

I conclude, therefore, that something more than a world of separate democratic states is necessary for the survival of man

in the nuclear age. If mankind had not developed these fantastic powers of destruction, a world of separate sovereign democratic states might have been a possible and a tolerable world. No doubt there would have been periodic wars; but then there always have been periodic wars throughout human history and, somehow or other, civilisation has survived them. The development of nuclear weapons has changed all that. I do not see how we can possibly escape the conclusion that full-scale nuclear war is incompatible with the maintenance of human civilisation.

World Unity

What is necessary and indispensable for human survival is not merely the spread of democracy from one country to another until the world consists of democratic states. What is necessary, on the contrary, is *world democracy*. And I mean by this nothing less than the unification of the world under one democratic government. I cannot see how, in the long run, human civilisation can survive unless within a few generations it somehow produces a government which is both worldwide in extent and responsible directly or indirectly to a world electorate. By "responsible" I mean that it must be possible for the peoples of the world, by one means or another, to hire and fire that government. And that means that it must be possible for them to choose between different kinds of government; and it must be possible for them at least to influence their government while it is in power. In a word, those essential institutions of democracy which I defined earlier in respect of any particular state, must be applied on a world-wide scale.

Of course all this is a long distance off. It cannot possibly come into existence immediately. But many of you I am sure will go much further in scepticism than this and say that world democracy can never come into existence; or at any rate that it is extremely unlikely. Well, maybe. If you say that, what you are really saying is that human survival in the nuclear age is very unlikely. You may well be right. But I should like to hear of any other aim, goal, cause, or ideal which can offer mankind the hope of survival in the nuclear age. I think that it is world

democracy or nothing. After all, the fact that a goal is distant and difficult of attainment has never prevented man from giving his allegiance to it.

If you ask me for details of how a world unity might come about I cannot give them. It may be that the only way to the achievement of world unity soon enough to prevent world destruction will prove to be a very undemocratic way. It may be that, initially, it will have to be done by a virtual dictatorship of the major nuclear powers. Nevertheless that would not be tolerable in the long run. A unified world would have in the end to become a world democracy. Nor do I think it particularly important to try and imagine how a world democracy would be organised. I suppose that, for many decades, it might be organised indirectly upon the basis of the election of a world government by national governments (no doubt on some weighted system) which were themselves democratically elected.

But surely in the end it must be voted for directly by the peoples of the world. I regard the United Nations as a precious expression of man's aspirations toward some sort of world government, rather than as anything closely resembling a world government itself. The United Nations is a forum of debate and discussion and as such indispensable. But is is not in any sense a government. A world democratic government must have two characteristics—responsibility and power: the United Nations by its very nature can have neither.

A General Conclusion

In the light of 20th-century experience, I may conclude that countries may have many sorts of economic systems, ranging from decidedly capitalist systems to completely socialist systems. With good luck and skill, any or all of these systems may be made to work tolerably well—though in my opinion the more socialistic systems will prove much the more satisfactory. Two things, therefore, have become even more important than the exact way in which we organise our economies. The first is whether or not we organise the political life of our nations upon a democratic basis. The second is the search for that world-wide unity of the human race without which we are all bound

to perish in the nuclear age. The political arrangements which we establish within our own countries matter vitally, because experience shows that unless they are democratic, all sorts of injustices, instabilities, and outright disasters occur. Our capacity to unite the world matters more vitally still because the lesson of the nuclear age is this. "Unite or perish!"

—JOHN STRACHEY, *The Challenge of Democracy, Encounter*, Pamphlet No. 10 (1963)

Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution (1947–1948):

PREAMBLE

The people of the earth having agreed
that the advancement of man
in spiritual excellence and physical welfare
is the common goal of mankind;
that universal peace is the prerequisite
for the pursuit of that goal;
that justice in turn is the prerequisite of peace,
and peace and justice stand or fall together;
that iniquity and war inseparably spring
from the competitive anarchy of the national states;
that therefore the age of nations must end,
and the era of humanity begin;
the governments of the nations have decided
to order their separate sovereignties
in one government of justice,
to which they surrender their arms;
and to establish, as they do establish,
this Constitution
as the covenant and fundamental law
of the Federal Republic of the World.

DECLARATION OF DUTIES AND RIGHTS

A.

The universal government of justice as covenanted and pledged in this Constitution is founded on the Rights of Man.

The principles underlying the Rights of Man are and shall be permanently stated in the Duty of everyone everywhere, whether a citizen sharing in the responsibilities and privileges of World Government or a ward and pupil of the World Commonwealth:

to serve with word and deed, and with productive labor according to his ability, the spiritual and physical advancement of the living and of those to come, as the common cause of all generations of men;

to do unto others as he would like others to do unto him;

to abstain from violence,

except for the repulse of violence as commanded or granted under law.

B.

In the context therefore of social duty and service, and in conformity with the unwritten law which philosophies and religions alike called the Law of Nature and which the Republic of the World shall strive to see universally written and enforced by positive law:

it shall be the right of everyone everywhere to claim and maintain for himself and his fellowmen:

release from the bondage of poverty and from the servitude and exploitation of labor, with rewards and security according to merit and needs;

freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in any creed or party or craft, within the pluralistic unity and purpose of the World Republic;

protection of individuals and groups against subjugation and tyrannical rule, racial or national, doctrinal or cultural, with safeguards for the self-determination of minorities and dissenters;

and any such other freedoms and franchises as are inherent in man's inalienable claims to life, liberty, and the dignity of

the human person, and as the legislators and judges of the World Republic shall express and specify.

C.

The four elements of life—earth, water, air, energy—are the common property of the human race. The management and use of such portions thereof as are vested in or assigned to particular ownership, private or corporate or national or regional, of definite or indefinite tenure, of individualist or collectivist economy, shall be subordinated in each and all cases to the interest of the common good.

Grant of Powers

I.

The jurisdiction of the World Government as embodied in its organs of power shall extend to:

a) The control of the observance of the Constitution in all the component communities and territories of the Federal World Republic, which shall be indivisible and one;

b) The furtherance and progressive fulfillment of the Duties and Rights of Man in the spirit of the foregoing Declaration, with their specific enactment in such fields of federal and local relations as are described hereinafter (Art. 27 through 33);

c) The maintenance of peace; and to that end the enactment and promulgation of laws which shall be binding upon communities and upon individuals as well,

d) the judgment and settlement of any conflicts among component units, with prohibition of recourse to interstate violence,

e) the supervision of and final decision on any alterations of boundaries between states or unions thereof,

f) the supervision of and final decision on the forming of new states or unions thereof,

g) the administration of such territories as may still be immature for self-government, and the declaration in due time of their eligibility therefor,

h) the intervention in intrastate violence and violations of law which affect world peace and justice,

i) the organization and disposal of federal armed forces,

j) the limitation and control of weapons and of the domestic militias in the several component units of the World Republic;

k) The establishment, in addition to the Special Bodies listed hereinafter (Art. 8 and 9), of such other agencies as may be conducive to the development of the earth's resources and to the advancement of physical and intellectual standards, with such advisory or initiating or arbitrating powers as shall be determined by law;

l) The laying and collecting of federal taxes, and the establishment of a plan and a budget for federal expenditures,

m) the administration of the World Bank and the establishment of suitable world fiscal agencies for the issue of money and the creation and control of credit,

n) the regulation of commerce affected with federal interest,

o) the establishment, regulation, and, where necessary or desirable, the operation of means of transportation and communication which are of federal interest;

p) The supervision and approval of laws concerning emigration and immigration and the movements of peoples,

q) the granting of federal passports;

r) The appropriation, under the right of eminent domain, of such private or public property as may be necessary for federal use, reasonable compensation being made therefor;

s) The legislation over and administration of the territory which shall be chosen as Federal District and of such other territories as may be entrusted directly to the Federal Government.

2.

The powers not delegated to the World Government by this Constitution, and not prohibited by it to the several members of the Federal World Republic, shall be reserved to the several states or nations or unions thereof.

The Federal Convention, The President, The Legislature

3.

The sovereignty of the Federal Republic of the World resides in the people of the world. The primary powers of the World Government shall be vested in:

a) the Federal Convention,

b) the President,

c) the Council and the Special Bodies,

d) the Grand Tribunal, the Supreme Court, and the Tribune of the People,

e) the Chamber of Guardians.

4.

The Federal Convention shall consist of delegates elected directly by the people of all states and nations, one delegate for each million of population or fraction thereof above one-half million, with the proviso that the people of any extant state . . . ranging between 100,000 and 1,000,000, shall be entitled to elect one delegate, but any such state with a population below 100,000 shall be aggregated for federal electoral purposes to the electoral unit closest to its borders.

The delegates to the Federal Convention shall vote as individuals, not as members of national or otherwise collective representations [except as specified hereinafter, Art. 46, paragraph 2, and Art. 47].

The Convention shall meet in May of every third year, for a session of thirty days.

5.

The Federal Convention shall subdivide into nine Electoral Colleges according to the nine Societies of kindred nations and cultures, or Regions, wherefrom its members derive their powers, such Regions being:

1) the continent of Europe and its islands outside the Russian area, together with the United Kingdom if the latter so decides, and with such overseas English- or French- or Cape Dutch-

speaking communities of the British Commonwealth of Nations or the French Union as decide to associate (this whole area here tentatively denominated *Europa*);

2) the United States of America, with the United Kingdom if the latter so decides, and such kindred communities of British, or Franco-British, or Dutch-British, or Irish civilization and lineage as decide to associate (*Atlantis*);

3) Russia, European and Asiatic, with such East-Baltic or Slavic or South-Danubian nations as associate with Russia (*Eurasia*);

4) the Near and Middle East, with the states of North Africa, and Pakistan if the latter so decides (*Afrasia*);

5) *Africa*, south of the Sahara, with or without the South African Union as the latter may decide;

6) *India*, with Pakistan if the latter so decides;

7) China, Korea, Japan, with the associate archipelagoes of the North- and Mid-Pacific (*Asia Major*);

8) Indochina and Indonesia, with Pakistan if the latter so decides, and with such other Mid- and South-Pacific lands and islands as decide to associate (*Austrasia*);

9) the Western Hemisphere south of the United States (*Columbia*).

Each Electoral College shall nominate by secret ballot not more than three candidates, regardless of origin, for the office of President of the World Republic. The Federal Convention in plenary meeting, having selected by secret ballot a panel of three candidates from the lists submitted, shall elect by secret ballot one of the three as President, on a majority of two-thirds.

If three consecutive ballots have been indecisive, the candidate with the smallest vote shall be eliminated and between the two remaining candidates a simple majority vote shall be decisive.

6.

Each Electoral College shall then nominate by secret and proportional ballot twenty-seven candidates, originating from the respective Electoral Area or Region, for the World Council; with the proviso that one-third and not more than one-third of

the nominees shall not be members of the Federal Convention; and the nine lists having been presented to the Federal Convention, the Federal Convention in plenary meeting shall select by secret and proportional ballot nine Councilmen from each list, with the same proviso as above.

The Federal Convention shall also elect by secret and proportional ballot, on nominations, prior to the opening of the Convention, by such organizations of world-wide importance and lawfully active in more than three Regions as shall be designated [for the first election by the United Nations Assembly and subsequently] by the Council, eighteen additional members, regardless of origin; and the total membership of the World Council shall be thus ninety-nine.

7.

The primary power to initiate and enact legislation for the Federal Republic of the World shall be vested in the Council.

The tenure of the Council shall be three years.

The Council shall elect its Chairman, for its whole tenure of three years.

Councilors shall be re-eligible.

8.

Within the first three years of World Government the Council and the President shall establish three Special Bodies, namely:

a) a House of Nationalities and States, with representatives from each, for the safeguarding of local institutions and autonomies and the protection of minorities;

b) a Syndical or functional Senate, for the representation of syndicates and unions or occupational associations and any other corporate interests of transnational significance, as well as for mediation or arbitration in non-justiciable issues among such syndicates or unions or other corporate interests;

c) an Institute of Science, Education and Culture;

each of the three bodies with such membership and tenures and consultative or preparatory powers as shall be established by law and with no prejudice to the establishment of other advisory or technical agencies in accordance with the purposes stated hereinbefore (Art. 1, k).

9.

Within its first year the World Government shall establish a Special Body, to be named Planning Agency, of twenty-one members appointed by the President, subject to vetoes by two-thirds of the Council, for tenures of twelve years [except that the terms for the initial membership shall be staggered by lot, with one-third of it, seven members, ceasing from office and being replaced every fourth year].

It shall be the function of the Planning Agency to envisage the income of the Federal Government and to prepare programs and budgets for expenditures, both for current needs and for long-range improvements. These programs and budgets shall be submitted by the President, with his recommendations, to the Council, as provided hereinafter (Art. 13).

Plans for improvement of the world's physical facilities, either public or private, and for the productive exploitation of resources and inventions shall be submitted to the Agency or to such Development Authorities or regional subagencies as it may establish. The Agency shall pass judgment on the social usefulness of such plans.

Members of the Planning Agency shall not be re-eligible nor shall they, during their tenure in the Agency, have membership in any other federal body.

10.

The executive power, together with initiating power in federal legislation, shall be vested in the President. His tenure shall be six years.

The President shall not have membership in the Council.

The President shall not be re-eligible. He shall not be eligible to the Tribunate of the People until nine years have elapsed since the expiration of his term.

No two successive Presidents shall originate from the same Region.

11.

The President shall appoint a Chancellor. The Chancellor, with the approval of the President, shall appoint the Cabinet.

The Chancellor shall act as the President's representative before the Council in the exercise of legislative initiative. The Chancellor and the Cabinet members shall have at any time the privilege of the floor before the Council.

But no Chancellor or Cabinet member shall have a vote or shall hold membership in the Council, nor, if he was a member of the Council at the moment of his executive appointment, shall he be entitled to resume his seat therein when leaving the executive post unless he be re-elected at a subsequent Convention.

No one shall serve as Chancellor for more than six years, nor as Cabinet member for more than twelve, consecutive or not.

No three Cabinet members at any one time and no two successive Chancellors shall originate from the same Region.

The Council shall have power to interrogate the Chancellor and the Cabinet and to adopt resolutions on their policies.

The Chancellor and the Cabinet shall resign when the President so decides or when a vote of no confidence by the absolute majority of fifty or more of the Council is confirmed by a second such vote; but no second vote shall be taken and held valid if less than three months have elapsed from the first.

12.

The sessions of the Council, as well as those of the Grand Tribunal and the Supreme Court, shall be continuous, except for one yearly recess of not more than ten weeks or two such recesses of not more than five weeks each, as the body concerned may decide.

13.

The budget of the World Government, upon recommendation by the Planning Agency, shall be presented every three years by the President to the Council, which shall pass it, or reject it in whole titles, by majority vote; the same procedure to apply when at other intervals the President requests additional appropriations or approval of changes.

14.

Any legislation of the Council can be vetoed by the President within thirty days of its passage. But the Council can overrule the veto if its new vote, by a majority of two-thirds, finds sup-

port, within sixty days of the President's action, in the majority of the Grand Tribunal [and no such support shall be required during the tenure of the first President].

15.

The President can be impeached on grounds of treason to the Constitution, or usurpation of power, or felony, or insanity, or other disease impairing permanently his mind.

The vote of impeachment shall be final when three-quarters of the Council and three-quarters of the Grand Tribunal concur and the majority of the Supreme Court validates the legality of the proceedings.

If a President is impeached or resigns or dies in the interval between two sessions of the Federal Convention, the Chairman of the Council shall become Acting President until the new Convention elects a new President; and the Council shall elect a new Chairman.

The Grand Tribunal and The Supreme Court

16.

The supreme judiciary power of the World Republic shall be vested in a Grand Tribunal of sixty Justices, with the President of the World Republic as Chief Justice and Chairman, and the Chairman of the Council as Vice-Chairman ex officio.

The President as Chief Justice shall appoint the Justices of the Grand Tribunal and fill the vacancies, subject to vetoes by the Council on majorities of two-thirds. He shall have power to overrule any such veto if he finds support in a two-thirds majority of the Justices in office [except that no such power shall be vested in the first President].

No one, except the Chairman of the Council, shall hold membership at the same time in the Council and the Tribunal; nor shall a Chancellor or Cabinet member hold membership in the Tribunal or be eligible to it until six years have elapsed from the termination of his executive office.

17.

The tenure of the Chief Justice and Chairman and of the Vice-Chairman of the Grand Tribunal shall be the time of their tenure

of office respectively as President of the World Republic and as Chairman of the Council.

The President shall have power to appoint an Alternate, subject to approval by the Grand Tribunal, for the exercise of such of his functions in the judiciary branch and for such a time within his tenure as he may decide.

The tenures of the sixty Justices shall be fifteen years [except that the terms for the initial membership shall be staggered by lot, with one-fifth of it, twelve Justices, ceasing from office and being replaced every third year].

Justices of the Grand Tribunal shall not be re-eligible, except that a Justice appointed as Chancellor or Cabinet member, having resigned his membership in the Tribunal, shall be re-eligible to it for the unfulfilled portion of his tenure when six years have elapsed from the termination of his executive office.

18.

The sixty Justices shall be assigned twelve to each of five Benches:

the First Bench to deal with constitutional issues between the primary organs and powers of the World Government as well as with all issues and cases in which the Tribune of the People shall decide to appear in his capacity of World Attorney and defender of the Rights of Man;

the Second Bench to deal with issues and conflicts between the World Government and any of its component units, whether single states or unions thereof or Regions, as well as with issues and conflicts of component units of the World Republic among themselves;

the Third Bench to deal with issues and conflicts between the World Government and individual citizens or corporations or unions or any other associations of citizens;

the Fourth Bench to deal with issues and conflicts among component units, whether single states or unions of states or Regions, and individual citizens or corporations or unions or any other associations of citizens when such issues and conflicts affect the interpretation or enactment of federal law;

the Fifth Bench to deal with issues and conflicts, when they affect the interpretation and enactment of federal law, either

among individual citizens or among corporations, unions, syndicates, or any other collective organizations of citizens and interests.

Each Region shall be represented in each Bench by at least one member and not more than two.

19.

The Supreme Court shall be of seven members: five representing one each Bench, with the Chief Justice as their Chairman and the Chairman of the Council as their Vice-Chairman ex officio; and the active membership of the Benches shall thus remain of eleven each.

No two members of the Supreme Court shall originate from the same Region.

The representatives of the Benches in the Supreme Court shall be elected by secret vote of the Grand Tribunal in plenary session, with each Justice casting a ballot for five candidates, one from each Bench, and with those candidates elected who have obtained the largest vote, except that any presumptive electee shall be held ineligible whose assignment to the Court would duplicate the representation therein of any one Region or Bench.

If the first vote fails to fill all seats, the vote shall be repeated according to the same regulations.

The tenures of the members of the Supreme Court shall be: for the Chairman and Vice-Chairman the same as their tenures of office respectively as President of the World Republic and as Chairman of the Council, and for the other members six years, at the end of which each of the five elected by the Grand Tribunal may be re-elected or shall be restored to the Bench whereof he was the delegate; but no Justice shall sit in the Court beyond his regular term of membership in the Tribunal; and when the latter term expires before the regular six-year term in the Court is completed, or when an elective member of the Court resigns or dies, the Grand Tribunal shall fill the vacancy for the unfulfilled portion of the term by secret partial election in plenary session, with the same proviso as above in regard to the representation of Regions.

Regions which have not been represented in the Supreme

Court for two successive six-year terms shall have mandatory precedence in the elections for the third term.

20.

The Supreme Court shall distribute the cases among the five Benches of the Grand Tribunal according to competences as specified hereinbefore [Art. 18].

Cases where competences overlap or are otherwise doubtful shall be referred to such Bench or Benches jointly as the Supreme Court shall decide.

The Supreme Court shall have power to modify the rules of assignment for the five Benches as specified in Art. 18, subject to approval by the majority of the Council and by a two-thirds majority of the Grand Tribunal concurrently.

21.

It shall be the office and function of the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the Benches, within three months of their issuance, said decisions to become effective upon registration by the Court, or, when annulled, to be returned for revision each to the Bench which judged the case, or to another, or to others jointly as the Court may decide; annulment to be pronounced in cases of unfair trial or faulty procedure, and also for reasons of substance when final appeal was filed by the losing party, if the Court at its own discretion choose to take cognizance thereof, or by the Tribune of the People, whose demand shall be mandatory.

22.

The Grand Tribunal, with the approval of the Supreme Court, shall establish Lower Federal Courts in such number and places as conditions in the component units of the World Republic shall require, and a Federal Appellate Court in each Region. It shall also determine the rules and competences of such courts, and appoint their officials on the basis of competitive examinations.

23.

The President or his Alternate and the Chairman of the Council shall not sit as judges in cases affecting the solution of conflicts between the President and the Council.

The President or Acting President or Alternate, or a Justice or the Chairman of the Council in his capacity of Justice, shall not sit as a judge in cases involving his appointment or impeachment or demotion or tenure or in any other way affecting his particular interest.

24.

No member of the Council or the Grand Tribunal shall be liable to removal from office until a criminal sentence on charges of felony or grave misdemeanor is final. But he shall be suspended from office, pending last recourse to the Grand Tribunal, when a sentence of guilty, issued by a lower court, has been confirmed by a Federal Appellate Court.

The Supreme Court shall pronounce final judgment on the legality of the proceedings. It shall also pronounce final judgment on the legal validity of elections and appointments to the Council and the Tribunal, and to the offices of President and of Tribune of the People.

25.

The President in his capacity of World Chief Justice shall have power of pardon over sentences passed under federal law.

The Tribune of the People and The World Law

26.

The Federal Convention, after electing the Council, shall elect by secret ballot the Tribune of the People as a spokesman for the minorities, this office to be vested in the candidate obtaining the second largest vote among the eligible candidates; ineligible to the office of Tribune being any candidate having also been nominated by any Electoral College for the office of President in the current Convention, or having been a President or Acting President or Alternate or a member of the Grand Tribunal at any time in the nine years preceding said Convention, or originating from the same Region as the President simultaneously in office.

The Tribune of the People shall not have membership in the Council.

The tenure of the Tribune of the People shall be three years. He shall have power to appoint a Deputy, subject to the same ineligibilities as above, with tenure to expire not later than his own.

He shall not be re-eligible, nor shall he be eligible to the office of President or Alternate or Justice of the Grand Tribunal, until nine years have elapsed from the expiration of his present term.

The Tribune, or his appointed Deputy, shall have the privilege of the floor before the Grand Tribunal and, under such regulations as shall be established by law, before the Supreme Court; but no vote in either; and he shall not be present when a vote is taken.

27.

It shall be the office and function of the Tribune of the People to defend the natural and civil rights of individuals and groups against violation or neglect by the World Government or any of its component units; to further and demand, as a World Attorney before the World Republic, the observance of the letter and spirit of this Constitution; and to promote thereby, in the spirit of its Preamble and Declaration of Duties and Rights, the attainment of the goals set to the progress of mankind by the efforts of the ages.

28.

No law shall be made or held valid in the World Republic or any of its component units:

1) inflicting or condoning discrimination against race or nation or sex or caste or creed or doctrine; or

2) barring through preferential agreements or coalitions of vested interests the access on equal terms of any state or nation to the raw materials and the sources of energy of the earth; or

3) establishing or tolerating slavery, whether overt or covert, or forced labor, except as equitable expiation endured in state or federal controlled institutions and intended for social service and rehabilitation of convicted criminals; or

4) permitting, whether by direction or indirection, arbitrary seizure or search, or unfair trial, or excessive penalty, or application of ex post facto laws; or

5) abridging in any manner whatsoever, except as a punishment inflicted by law for criminal transgression, the citizen's exercise of such responsibilities and privileges of citizenship as are conferred on him by law; or

6) curtailing the freedom of communication and information, of speech, of the press and of expression by whatever means, of peaceful assembly, of travel;

paragraphs 5 and 6 to be subject to suspension according to circumstances, universally or locally, in time of emergency imperiling the maintenance and unity of the World Republic; such state of emergency, world-wide or local, to be proposed by the Chamber of Guardians and proclaimed concurrently by a two-thirds majority of the Council and a two-thirds majority of the Grand Tribunal for a period not in excess of six months, to be renewable on expiration with the same procedure for successive periods of six months or less but in no case beyond the date when the time of emergency is proclaimed closed, on the proposal of the Chamber of Guardians by simple majority votes of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal concurrently or, if the Guardians' proposal is deemed unduly delayed, by three-quarters majority votes of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal concurrently.

29.

Capital punishment shall not be inflicted under federal law.

30.

Old age pensions, unemployment relief, insurance against sickness or accident, just terms of leisure, and protection to maternity and infancy shall be provided according to the varying circumstances of times and places as the local law may direct.

Communities and states unable to provide adequate social security and relief shall be assisted by the Federal Treasury, whose grants or privileged loans shall be administered under federal supervision.

31.

Every child from the age of six to the age of twelve shall be entitled to instruction and education at public expense, such primary six-year period to be obligatory and further education

to be accessible to all without discrimination of age or sex or race or class or creed.

Communities and states unable to fulfill this obligation shall be assisted by the Federal Treasury with the same proviso as in Art. 30.

32.

All property or business whose management and use have acquired the extension and character of a federal public service, or whereon restrictive trade practices have conferred the character and power of a transnational monopoly, shall become the property of the Federal Government upon payment of a just price as determined by law.

33.

Every individual or group or community shall have the right of appeal against unjust application of a law, or against the law itself, gaining access through the inferior courts, local or federal, to the superior and the Grand Tribunal, and securing the counsel and support of the Tribune of the People when the Tribune so decides; and, if a law or statute is found evidently in conflict with the guarantees pledged in the foregoing articles or irreparably in contradiction with the basic principles and intents of the World Republic as stated in the Preamble to this Constitution and in its Declaration of Duties and Rights, the Grand Tribunal shall have power to recommend to the Supreme Court that such law or statute be declared, and the Supreme Court shall have power to declare it, null and void.

34.

The Tribune of the People cannot be impeached except on the same grounds and with the same procedure as specified for the President in Art. 15.

If the Tribune of the People is impeached or resigns or dies, his substitute for the unfulfilled portion of his tenure shall be the candidate to the Tribunate who was next in line in the last Federal Convention, with the same provisos in regard to eligibility as in Art. 26, first paragraph.

The Chamber of Guardians

35.

The control and use of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of the World shall be assigned exclusively to a Chamber of Guardians under the chairmanship of the President, in his capacity of Protector of the Peace. The other Guardians shall be six Councilmen elected by the Council and the Grand Tribunal in Congress assembled, for terms of three years. [But the Grand Tribunal shall not participate in the first election.]

One former President shall also sit in the Chamber of Guardians, the sequence to be determined term for term, or, if he resign or die, for the fractional term, according to seniority in the presidential office; he shall have the privilege of the floor in the deliberations of the Chamber, but no vote in its decisions.

Officers holding professional or active rank in the armed forces of the Federal Republic, or in the domestic militia of any component unit thereof, shall not be eligible as Guardians.

36.

The election of the six elective Guardians shall be by secret and proportional vote, with each Elector casting a ballot of six names or less; but no three Guardians of the seven, including the President and excluding the ex-President, shall originate from the same Region; and any presumptive electee whose election would contravene this norm shall be declared ineligible and replaced by the candidate fulfilling the norm and having obtained the next largest vote.

Regions which have not been represented among the seven Guardians referred to above for two successive three-year terms shall have mandatory precedences in the subsequent elections; but the Guardian or Guardians originating from a nation or Region where sedition against the World Republic is actual or, according to the majority of the Chamber, imminently expected shall cease from office and be replaced; unless the other Guardians decide unanimously otherwise.

No Guardian can be impeached or in any way suspended or removed from office for any other reason, except on such

grounds and with such procedure as specified for the President and the Tribune of the People hereinbefore (Art. 15 and 34), and for the Guardians hereinafter (Art. 38).

If a Guardian resigns or dies or is in any way suspended or removed, his substitute for the unfulfilled portion of the term shall be chosen by partial election, with the same rules and provisos as in the first two paragraphs of this article, each elector casting a ballot of one or more names as the number of vacancies may be.

37.

The Chancellor shall have access to the Chamber of Guardians as Deputy of the President whose vote he shall cast by proxy if the President so decides.

38.

Appropriations for the budget of Peace and Defense, under control of the Chamber of Guardians, as proposed by the Chamber at the beginning of each term for the whole duration thereof, shall be submitted by the President to the Council, in conformity with Art. 13. But if a state of emergency is declared, in the manner and limits as specified hereinbefore (Art. 28, last paragraph), the Chamber shall have power to demand and appropriate such additional funds as the emergency demands, subject to auditing and sanction by the Council when the emergency is closed; whereafter, if sanction is denied, the Guardians responsible shall be liable to impeachment and prosecution for usurpation of power with the same procedure as specified for the President and the Tribune of the People hereinbefore (Art. 15 and 34).

39.

The Chamber shall have power to propose by absolute majority, subject to approval by two-thirds majority votes of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal concurrently, extraordinary powers, world-wide or local, to be conferred on the President beyond those assigned to him by this Constitution, when a state of emergency, as provided in Art. 28, is proclaimed; such powers not to be granted for periods exceeding six months each and

to be relinquished before the expiration of any such period as soon as the state of emergency, in conformity with Art. 28, is proclaimed closed.

40.

The Chamber of Guardians shall answer interrogations from the Council on its general and administrative directives, but no vote shall be taken after discussion thereof, except as otherwise provided in Art. 28 and 39; and the decisions of the Chamber in matters technical and strategic shall be final, and withheld from publicity when the Chamber so decides.

41.

The Chamber of Guardians, assisted by a General Staff and an Institute of Technology whose members it shall appoint, shall determine the technological and the numerical levels that shall be set as limits to the domestic militias of the single communities and states or unions thereof.

Armed forces and the manufacture of armaments beyond the levels thus determined shall be reserved to the World Government.

The Federal Capital and Federal Language and Standards

42.

Within one year of its foundation the World Republic shall choose a Federal Capital, or a site therefor, with eminent domain over it and an adequate Federal District.

43.

Within three years of its foundation the Federal Government shall designate one language, which shall be standard for the formulation and interpretation of the federal laws; and for analogous purposes, relative to communication, taxation, and finances, it shall establish in its first year a federal unit of currency with a federal system of measures and a federal calender.

The Amending Power

44.

Amendments to this Constitution, recommended concurrently by a two-thirds majority of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal, shall be in force when approved by a two-thirds majority of the Federal Convention in the Constitutional Session following the recommendation.

Constitutional Sessions, of thirty days or less, as the discussion may require and the majority may decide, shall be held immediately after the ordinary electoral session in the third Federal Convention and thereafter every ninth year.

[But no amendment altering the electoral units as listed in Art. 5, or the assignment to them of seats in the Council and the other Federal bodies, shall be recommended to the first of such Sessions.]

Appendix 3

NOTE: The following sections on the necessity of government and on war and peace are taken from my book *A Vision of the Future* (New York, 1984), no longer in print.

The Necessity of Government

If human beings could engage in their pursuit of happiness more effectively without living in states and under the auspices of government, then neither the state nor its government would be necessary as a means to the ultimate objective at which human beings should aim—living decent human lives.

In the preceding chapter, I argued that the goodness of the state or civil society lies in its being indispensable to living a civilized life and obtaining all the real goods that individuals cannot obtain by themselves alone or under the conditions of family and tribal life. The goodness of the state or civil

society was thus seen to be inseparable from its necessity as an indispensable means to the ultimate good we should seek.

What holds for the state holds also for government. Its goodness resides in its necessity—in its indispensability as a means. But a means to what? Is it not possible for human beings to achieve good lives for themselves without the constraints imposed by government through its sanctions and the coercive force of its laws? Is not the road to happiness on earth more open to those who pursue that goal without being subject to government?

Those who call themselves anarchists—philosophical, not bomb-throwing, anarchists—answer such questions with resounding affirmations. When they call for the immediate abolition of the state or for its gradual withering away, they identify the state itself with government by might, that is, by the coercive force of its various sanctions. This is what they abominate.

They think that it is quite possible for human beings, either as they are now or as they might become under altered conditions, to live peacefully and harmoniously together in society and to and to act in concert for a common good in which they all participate, and to do this without the restraining force exercised by the state or its government. They do not see in the complete autonomy that everyone would have under anarchy any threat to the peace, harmony, and order of social life.

Why are they profoundly wrong? One answer was given by Alexander Hamilton when he said that if men were angels, no government would be necessary for social life. Spelled out in a little more detail, Hamilton's reference to angels expressed his understanding of angels as completely virtuous, and so obedient by free choice to just laws. When he rejected as illusory the attribution to mankind of angelic virtue, he did not thereby intend to deny that some men have sufficient, if not angelic, virtue to obey just laws out of respect for their

authority and without responding to the threat of coercive force.

Some men, yes, but not all! That is precisely why some portion of the individuals living together in society must be constrained by coercive force from injuring their fellows or acting against the common good of all. Hence, government with its sanctions is as necessary for social life as that, in turn, is necessary for the pursuit of happiness.

Hamilton's argument is not only sound, but unanswerable by philosophical anarchists in the light of all the known historical realities. Their only out is to appeal, beyond the facts about human beings as they now are, to what human beings might become under radically altered future circumstances.

The hope for a new type of man, with a different human nature that has been altered by external circumstances, is bizarre and groundless. The specific nature of any living organism is gene-determined, not determined in any essential respect by external circumstances. Human nature may be overlaid by all the nurtural influences imposed by the environment, but that natural overlay does not alter the underlying nature.

There is one point with respect to which one must concede some soundness to the philosophical anarchist's position. The coercive force that is exercised by a tyrannical and despotic government is an evil from which human beings should be emancipated. But constitutional and just governments also exercise coercive force; and then, as Hamilton argued, that confers a benefit to be sought, not an evil to be avoided.

Sound and answerable as Hamilton's argument may be, it is not the only or complete answer to the position of the philosophical anarchist. The other part of the answer consists in seeing that the authority of government, quite apart from its exercise of coercive force, is necessary for the concerted action of a number of individuals for a common purpose.

Let us consider the simplest possible case of three individuals—scientists engaged in the exploration of the far

reaches of the Amazon. Before they embark on their expedition, must they not all agree on the method by which decisions will be reached about matters upon which they, as reasonable individuals, can possibly disagree? Without such agreement, do they not stand in danger of having unresolved differences of opinion among them frustrate, even ruin, their concerted efforts?

Granted affirmative answers to these two questions, what are their options? Only two appear to be available. To insist upon unanimity in the solution of all problems they are likely to face is to deny that reasonable differences of opinion are likely to arise. Grant that likelihood and then the only options left are twofold: (1) the choice of one of the three as the leader whose decisions about all matters shall prevail; and (2) the adoption of the principle that decisions will be reached by a majority of two against one.

Either principle of decision-making must be adopted unanimously on the part of the three explorers. It cannot be imposed by one of them upon the other two; it cannot be selected by a majority of two against one, because the problem of how matters should be decided must first be solved by the agreement of all three. Leadership by one can be set up by that one only through force. This we have excluded in our imaginary case. The principle of majority rule cannot be set up by a majority vote, not unless the majority imposes it by force.

Decision-making can, of course, be avoided entirely by tossing a coin. That, however, is an abdication of government, leaving everything to chance instead of putting reason to use.

Our hypothetical example of the three explorers setting up some instrument of government for their expedition has excluded the use of force either to institute government in the first place or to exercise it, once it has been set up. Here, then, we have government with voluntarily established authority and with no recourse to might. We also have government that serves a necessity other than that of preventing or

reducing antisocial or unjust conduct on the part of some portion of society's population.

This picture portrays government as an indispensable means to the concerted action of a number of individuals for a common purpose. That is the essence of social life. Many of the decisions that have to be made may be morally indifferent; such as traffic ordinances about driving on the left-hand or the right-hand side of the road. There is nothing just or unjust about either alternative. But when the circumstances are such that traffic control becomes necessary for the security of life and limb, one or the other alternative must be chosen. Government is necessary to decide which, and to render that decision with the requisite authority.

War and Peace

Implicit in the preceding pages are insights about war and peace that are the best fruits of thinking about the idea of government.

Our conventional and colloquial use of these two terms has for centuries obscured the difference between a state of war and warfare, and between civil peace and the mere absence of warfare.

In the vocabulary of daily usage, we speak of making war as an engagement in battle by the employment of weapons. When victory by one side or exhaustion on the part of both brings warfare to a conclusion, we refer to the cessation of violent hostilities as the onset of peace. Arrangements are then entered into by treaties or other devices to prolong the armistice which we think of as preserving peace.

To enlarge and improve our understanding of these matters, we need only remember what has been said in the preceding pages about the benefit that government confers upon any society by ensuring its domestic tranquility, which is the condition of civil peace. Civil peace is not just the ab-

sence of warfare, nor is it the absence of serious conflicts between individuals or groups of individuals who comprise the population of a society. It consists rather in the possibility of resolving all the conflicts that may arise in a society without resort to illicit violence and an illegitimate use of force.

There are only two ways in which human conflicts can be resolved: either by talk or by force. When talk fails, and the conflict is serious enough to demand resolution, resort to force—or the threat of force—is the only alternative. When the apparatus of government is adequate for the purpose, it provides the machinery for settling all conflicts or disputes by talk. It thus eliminates the need to have recourse to force and violence.

The adjudication of disputes in courts, the resolution of conflicts of opinion about public policy in legislative or other assemblies, the enforcement of the law, referenda, plebiscites, and elections, with one exception, are operations in which human beings talk about and talk away the differences that bring them into conflict.

The one exception to be noted is the enforcement of law. Here it would seem that talk alone does not suffice and the use of force must be employed. What force? Force employed by whom? The force that is vested in an arm of government, the force that a government employs, to prevent disruptions or breaches of the peace by criminal conduct that involves an illicit or illegitimate use of force.

A great German jurist, Hans Kelsen, pointed out that a de jure government, a rightfully established government, exercises a monopoly of authorized force. All other force, the resort to violence on the part of members of a society, either individually or in groups, is unauthorized force and, therefore, illicit or illegitimate.

As we have already observed, there are de facto as well as de jure governments—governments that rule by might alone, and rightfully established governments that have au-

thority as well as power, an authority that includes an authorized use of force to preserve peace.

Do both modes of government provide adequate machinery for preserving peace? In one sense, yes; in another, no.

Government by might alone, without legitimate authority, preserves peace by means of an unauthorized use of force. It succeeds, of course, only to the extent that the force at its disposal has overwhelming weight as against the force that can be employed by any dissident groups in the population.

Furthermore, to the extent that the government itself lacks justice and rules unjustly, the peace that it establishes and preserves by illegitimate force is a fragile and unstable condition. Sedition, insurrection, riot, and rebellion are always seething below the surface in any society in which gross injustices are inflicted upon the population.

What appears to be peace is really a state of war between rulers and ruled, for when long-standing abuses and a train of injustices bring them into serious conflict with one another, actual warfare breaks out between them. A state of war is that condition in which actual warfare is always latent. It is the ever-present possibility of which warfare is the actualization.

Perfect peace, in contrast, is that condition in which the possibility of actual warfare is totally eliminated by the adequacy of governmental means for settling all disputes by talk, by lawful devices, by government's monopoly of authorized force, and by providing all dissident groups within the population with legal means of dissent so that, where injustices exist, the abused or oppressed can seek to redress their grievances without resort to violence.

Perfect peace is obviously an ideal that may never be fully realized on earth. But it is also an ideal that is realized in some degree wherever rightfully instituted governments exist. It is approximated to whatever extent such governments govern justly, provide machinery adequate for the purpose of resolving all disputes, and exercise authorized force.

Three great political philosophers—Cicero, Machiavelli, and John Locke—have pointed out, in almost identical phraseology, that there are only two ways of settling disputes. One is by talk, by law, and by law enforcement. The other is by force or violence.

The first is the uniquely human method of settling conflicts. The second is the method of brutes, of the beasts of the jungle.

When the first method prevails and succeeds, we have the civil peace of civilized life. When it fails or is totally lacking, we have a state of war in which actual warfare is always below the surface of a merely apparent peace that is nothing but the temporary absence of fighting, of bloodshed, of violence.

Another great political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, completes the picture by pointing out that peace exists only within the boundaries of a state and among individuals living together under the benign auspices of a legitimate government. Between completely autonomous sovereigns—sovereign princes or sovereign states—there is always a state of war.

It is only in this century that we have come finally to recognize the soundness of his insight. We have invented the phrase "cold war" to refer to the state of war that sovereign states are in vis-à-vis one another. This is manifest in the conduct of foreign policy, in the actions of diplomats, in the subterfuges of espionage, and in the aggressive potency of the military installations that we call defense establishments. Lurking beneath the surface, ready to break out, is the hot war of the generals and the admirals, who are called upon to achieve the results that have been unsuccessfully sought by all the devices of the cold war.

Anarchy—the jungle in which all sovereign states find themselves—is identical with the alternatives of cold war and hot war. It is never a condition of peace, even when sovereign states appear to be friendly rather than hostile in relation to

one another. What we miscall peace between states is nothing but the absence of actual warfare between them. Genuine peace exists only when government replaces anarchy.

From the beginning of history to the present time, there has never been world peace, but only a plurality of peaces—as many as, at a given time, there are separate societies. In each of these, some mode of government establishes some degree of civil peace by the machinery it provides for settling disputes without resort to violence. The plurality of peaces is smaller or larger according to the number of separate societies in which individuals live under government. The size or extent of each of these plural peaces varies with the size of the domain and of the population that is governed.

In the course of history, mankind has passed from tribal peaces and tribal wars to the peaces of separate city-states and the wars between them. When city-states became empires with colonies, the extent of the peace units became enlarged, and so also did the wars in which imperial dominions engaged. When in modern times, national states emerged from and replaced the anarchy that existed among the petty principalities of the feudal system, the size of the peace units once again enlarged, and enlarged still further as national states became empires with colonies under their dominion. What was called the Pax Romana in the ancient world and has been called the Pax Britannica in the modern world represent such enlarged peace units.

In the twentieth century, the first century in which anything that deserves to be called a world war first occurred, world peace has not yet come into existence, though its possibility is presaged by the occurrence of world wars. The creation of the League of Nations after the First World War and the formation of the United Nations after the Second created inadequate devices for the establishment of world peace.

They may have served to inhibit the cold war, which always exists among sovereign states, from turning into the hot

war that is always latently present. But precisely because the League of Nations was not and the United Nations is not a government with a monopoly of authorized force, neither can be regarded as an instrument for establishing and preserving genuine peace. That the United Nations is not a government and cannot be one is plainly indicated by the fact that its members are all sovereign states, each completely autonomous, each able to withdraw at will or to exercise a nullifying veto over any action taken.

The Charter of the United Nations is analogous to the Articles of Confederation, under which the thirteen sovereign states on our Eastern Seaboard were associated with one another between the time they won their independence from Great Britain and the time they entered into a more perfect union by adopting a federal Constitution. With that transition, the civil peace of the United States of America replaced the state of war that prevailed among the thirteen sovereign states under the Articles of Confederation.

The lesson to be learned should be patently plain. If government is the indispensable means for establishing and preserving genuine peace wherever it is found on earth in the plural peaces that exist (however small or large their extent may be, varying with the size of the domain and the population that is governed), then it inexorably follows that genuine world peace requires world government.

The obstacles to the establishment of world government are many and various. The probability of its being realized can be estimated in terms of the difficulty of overcoming those impediments. The two ways in which it may be brought about in the first instance are identical with the two ways available for resolving human disputes or conflicts—by talk and by force.

The first way would involve the framing of a constitution by a world constitutional convention and the adoption of that constitution by all sovereign states, which would then relinquish their external sovereignty vis-à-vis one another.

The second way would involve a world war that resulted in world conquest without, at the same time, making the earth uninhabitable.

However unlikely the first way may appear to be, the second is even more unlikely. But the improbable, in whatever degree, is never the same as the impossible. However improbable may be the establishment and preservation of world peace by the institution of world federal government, its possibility remains untouched—for, since world government is *necessary* for world peace, and world peace is *necessary* for the survival and welfare of mankind, both must also be *possible.*

Appendix 4

NOTE: The following discussion of world government is excerpted from Chapter 16 in my book *The Common Sense of Politics* (New York, 1971), no longer in print.

World Government

(1)

The discussion so far has indicated the need for world government to overcome the defects intrinsic to parochial communities, defects that are not remediable by local governments. I would now like to treat this subject more extensively, for the formation of a world political community is the second major development required for the realization of the ideal that we can now project as possible.

[In an earlier chapter,] I pointed out that nothing short of the world state can adequately serve the end that the state, teleologically defined, should aim at, since peace in the fullest sense of that term is an essential condition of the good human life. Nothing less than the world state, therefore, perfectly realizes the idea of the state.

Peace must be understood in positive, not negative, terms. If it were merely the absence of overt violence, then we would have to admit that peace exists between sovereign states during such periods as they are not engaged in actual fighting. But we also know that peace in this purely negative sense is often replaced by actual warfare, especially if the sovereign states have conflicting interests that put them in the posture of hostility toward one another.

Positively conceived, peace exists only when institutions are operative to resolve conflicting interests and settle all serious differences without recourse to violence. It is in this positive sense of peace that civil peace—the peace that obtains within the boundaries of a state—is one of the boons conferred upon the members of a society by its institutions of government. They have ways of settling their differences without recourse to violence.

In sharp contradistinction to peace in this positive sense, the negative use of the word "peace" to signify nothing but *the absence of overt violence* conceals the fact that what is being described is a state of war—what we have come to call the "cold war," in which military establishments, active espionage, and propaganda are manifest threats of violence that has not yet become overt. While it is true that the cold war is an active enterprise only between hostile rather than between friendly nations, it is always present in some degree between sovereign states. Between sovereign states, whether friendly or hostile, peace in the positive sense of that term has never existed and cannot exist; the alternatives for them are not peace and war, but only cold war and hot war—threatening violence that cannot be prevented from turning into overt violence, because the relation of sovereign states precludes the one factor that is required for the preservation of civil peace—government.

In the history of mankind up to this moment, peace—or what I shall call *civil peace* to signify the positive sense of that term—has existed only within states, not between states. Even there, as we shall presently observe when we come to

consider the violence of revolutions, it may be illusory to the extent that the institutions of the society are unjust and breed revolution. Nevertheless, such civil peace as has obtained on earth, to whatever degree, has been the product of civil government.

If civil government is necessary for civil peace within the boundaries of a parochial society, then, for exactly the same reason, world civil government is necessary for world civil peace; and to achieve this we must replace the plurality of parochial societies, each a sovereign state, with the unity of a world state. The elimination of war between states—hot war or cold war—is identical with the elimination of a plurality of independent states, each of which is sovereign or subject to no superior in its external relations with other states. The elimination of war between states is not identical with the elimination of all forms of violence, for injustice may still breed revolution in a world community, as it has and does in parochial societies. Nevertheless, if we regard revolutionary violence as civil war, whether within the confines of a parochial society or in a world community, the replacement of international war by civil war through the formation of a world state is an advance, because civil war can lead to the restoration and improvement of civil peace, as international war cannot.

(2)

The foregoing constitutes an answer to the question, why world government is necessary for world civil peace, and, in part at least, it also answers the question of its desirability; for if worldwide civil peace is an indispensable means to the happiness of mankind, and if world government is an indispensable means to worldwide civil peace, then its necessity as a means makes it as desirable as the end it is needed to serve. But this leaves quite open the question whether world government is possible, as well as fails to touch on other considerations with regard to its desirability.

However appealing or persuasive it may be to say that if something is necessary as a means to an end that we are morally obligated to seek, it must be possible, that proposition by itself need not be our only answer to the question about the possibility of world government. The feasibility of world government depends on our being able to overcome two formidable obstacles. One of these is technological, the other political. Let me deal with each of these briefly.

The technological obstacle to world government appeared to be insurmountable in earlier centuries when the geographical barriers to communication and interaction among the peoples of the earth were of such an order that they could not function as fellow-citizens in a single community under one government. Technological advances have now shrunk the world, not in geodesic space, but in social space, to a size small enough to make its political as well as its economic unification feasible. If we are persuaded that the economic interdependence of the peoples of the world has now reached the point that makes their political unification desirable, we should also be able to see that the same technological factors that have produced global economic interdependence now make political unification feasible. Another sign pointing in the same direction is the advent of world wars, new in the twentieth century. The same technological advances that ushered in the era of world war—conflicts that have been and threaten to become more and more global in their extent—also provide the underpinnings for world peace by reducing the distances in social space and in communication and transportation time that were, in the past, obstacles to world political unification, as in the past they were also obstacles to global war.

The technological obstacles to world government being overcome, the only question of its feasibility concerns the political obstacles that remain. The difficulty of the problem that these present is such that one cannot be assured of its solution in the immediate future. All we can be sure of is

that, in principle, it is solvable, which is tantamount to saying that world government is, in principle, politically feasible, as well as being, in fact, technologically feasible.

If world government is to be, as it should be, the de jure government of a republic, the best hope for its coming to be lies in the adoption of a federal constitution for the world state, creating a federal union of participating states that have surrendered every vestige of external sovereignty in dealing with one another. The chief political obstacle to the adoption of a constitution for a world federal republic lies in the requirement that all the participating states must themselves be republics. I would go further and say that if the world state is to embody the political ideal to which we are committed, the participating states must not only be republics, but also socialist, democratic republics. This requisite degree of political homogeneity among all the participating members of a world federation—a union of socialist, democratic republics—may be extremely difficult to achieve in a relatively short time, though there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that it cannot be achieved if sufficient time is allowed for revolutions and reforms to occur in the parochial societies that now exist. . . .

(3)

But can the political obstacles, which represent real difficulties of a high order, be surmounted in the immediate future, or will it take several centuries or more of revolutionary changes and institutional reforms to remove the social, economic, and political heterogeneities that stand in the way of world government? That is a factual question and one that calls for a prediction which lies beyond the scope and competence of political philosophy as a normative discipline. However, one consideration can be mentioned as having a bearing on the question of time.

Twenty-five years ago, when the preliminary draft of a world constitution was published, the urgency to create a world government rested solely on the need to prevent a third

world war—more nearly global in its extent and, with the advent of atomic weapons, irremediably destructive of life on earth. Today there is the additional urgency that stems from the even more desperate need to prevent the destruction of the biosphere which, according to leading technologists, cannot be effectively accomplished by the action of parochial governments. A third world war has been postponed for twenty-five years and may be postponed indefinitely by the widespread fear of its cataclysmic consequences; but the destruction of the biosphere in the next twenty-five or fifty years can be prevented only by strenuous positive measures undertaken rapidly and carried out globally. The urgency of mounting and effectuating this program does more than reinforce the urgency of preventing global war: it sets a relatively short time as the period allowed us for doing what must be done. Men and nations everywhere may not be able much longer to close their eyes to the inexorable alternatives of one world or none.

I said earlier that the necessity of world government as an indispensable means to worldwide civil peace is only one point in answer to the question about its desirability as a political objective. Its indispensability as a means to preserving a life-sustaining and life-enhancing environment for mankind is another positive consideration. But there are still other considerations that should be mentioned before we face the objectionable features of a world state that might make it undesirable. Let me mention three briefly.

(1) The formation of a world community under world government is needed to eliminate the inequitable distribution of resources and wealth that has allowed the rich nations to dominate and exploit the poor nations. The same reforms that have been operative to overcome poverty within the technologically advanced welfare states must become operative on a worldwide basis to rectify the injustices suffered by the have-not nations. We must, in the words of Gunnar Myrdal, go beyond the parochial confines of the welfare state to extend participation in general economic welfare to all the peoples

of the world; and this can be done only by the regulation of a world economy by a world government that aims at the economic welfare of men everywhere. It should be added here that so long as the cold war exists and the hot war threatens, the wasteful employment of our productive powers to maintain military establishments can prevent us from producing enough wealth to remove poverty, no matter how far our productive technology may advance.

(2) What is true of poverty on a worldwide basis is similarly true of racism on a worldwide basis. This, like poverty, is not an evil confined within the borders of this or that parochial society. It is an evil that pervades a world in which nationalism generates ethnic and racial hatreds and hostilities. The elimination of racism requires a world community in which all men, of whatever stock or complexion, are fellow citizens, and no one is a foreigner, a barbarian, an enemy, or a subhuman alien.

(3) The formation of a world community under world government is needed to safeguard constitutional government and democratic processes from the political schizophrenia that besets parochial states whose foreign policies undermine or conflict with their domestic programs. The machinations of international politics usually evade or violate the principles of justice that the best parochial societies attempt to apply within their own borders. In addition, with the advent of war on a global scale, the so-called military-industrial complex has grown to such power that it has become a serious threat to the institutions of political democracy; but so long as parochial states remain in the posture of war toward one another, there may be no cure for this evil, which afflicts all the great powers—China and Russia as much as the United States.

(4)

With all these things in its favor, what disadvantages attach to world government that might raise a serious question for us about its desirability?

Certainly not that world government would require the abolition of the external sovereignty and independence of the parochial national states in existence today. That, as we have seen, counts as one of the great benefits world government would confer, not only serving the cause of peace but also helping to eliminate poverty and racism. Only myopic provincialism or, what is worse, an overriding commitment to short-term gains for a favored few against the interests of all the rest would lead anyone to regard the loss of national sovereignty as an unmitigated evil that overbalances all other considerations.

The only respectable objection with which I am acquainted derives from the fear that a monolithic world state would embody a centralization of authority and a concentration of power so massive that if it were converted into an instrument of despotism and tyranny, it would be one against which no countervailing force could ever prevail.

In reply to this objection, let me say, first, that the same constitutional safeguards that prevent a republic from becoming a despotism can be built into a world constitution in a manner that is appropriate to the organization of the government it sets up. Once again I would refer to the *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution* for a vision of how constitutional limitations on public officials and departments of government can safeguard the citizens of a world republic from abuses of authority or power, as these have been safeguarded by comparable devices in parochial societies.

In the second place, everything that has already been said about the preservation of residual autonomy for individuals and subordinate associations applies to world government, and with even greater force because of the number, variety, and size of the subordinate communities, corporations, and associations that would not only be included but would also be granted some measure of local autonomy in the organization of a world federal republic. In other words, the centralization of ultimate authority in the organs of a world

government should be counterbalanced by a decentralization of the functions to be performed by its subordinate components, each exercising the measure of residual autonomy that is requisite for an effective performance of its special function.

Finally, with all military power abolished, and with the only implements of authorized force available to government those which can be justified as means of preserving peace and protecting individuals against criminal violence, the power at the disposal of the world government might be considerably less than that provided by the armaments under control of the national governments of parochial societies. One of the great advances that will come about with the formation of a world republic will be the substitution of a legally constituted and civilly controlled police power for all the other forms of force that have been available to government. The only authorized force will be that of police operating solely to protect rights and to render the acts of government efficacious.

If injustice of one sort or another still persists in the world community after world government is instituted, or creeps back into it, and if the legal means for the redress of grievances are not adequate to rectify serious wrongs, revolutionary violence would still remain the only option, and having recourse to it would not be precluded; for world government, if properly constituted, would not have overwhelming force at its disposal, as it might if it were empowered with a vast military establishment proportionate to its global scope, rather than confined to the use of a civil police force designed primarily to preserve civil peace.

Appendix 5

NOTE: The following discussion of future possibilities is excerpted from Chapter 19, "Our Limited Vision of the Possible," in my book *The Common Sense of Politics* (New York, 1971), no longer in print.

I have proceeded throughout this book in terms of the vision of the possible that is now available to us in the light of past and present experience. Our enlarged conception of the possible, I have said, has enabled us to project a political ideal far beyond anything that our ancestors would have thought attainable. But I have also said that political philosophy is always conditioned by the historic limitations of the time in which it is being formulated. This is as true of any twentieth-century effort as it was true of the political formulations made in earlier centuries. The same mote that clouded the vision of earlier political philosophers still clouds our own, even if we are not so aware of it.

In the uprising that took place at the Sorbonne a few years ago, a student chalked up on the wall the following graffito: *Be realistic; attempt the impossible*! On the face of it, considered soberly and strictly, the statement is, of course, false. The impossible is that which cannot be done; and, therefore, it should not be attempted by anyone in his right mind. Nevertheless, the statement is a witty way of expressing the truth that the determination of what is possible or impossible is an extremely difficult matter, involving more knowledge of facts than is generally available at any time; and so, as this student was really saying, the spirit of progress should always challenge those who seek to preserve the status quo by claiming that the changes called for by justice lie beyond the bounds of the possible.

The same insight applies to our vision of a future state of affairs that precludes the possibility of further progress because all the institutional improvements that are needed for the happiness of mankind have been achieved. That vision may be defective, because we cannot foresee the effect on human life of factors that have not yet become operative. The further development of space exploration, for one thing, and, for another, the development of our power to manipulate the genetic code may bring with them social problems and social opportunities so novel and so consequential that the possi-

bility of progress may be enlarged beyond anything that we can now conceive. This, however, suggests the conclusion, not that institutional progress is without limits, but only that our present view of what its limits are may be inaccurate.

On the assumption, which it seems reasonable to make, that institutional progress has a definite limit even if we cannot correctly define it at this point in history, we are left with the question: Would reaching that limit mean the end of progress in human affairs? The answer is clearly no.

Before elucidating that answer, let me say a word in defense of the assumption on the basis of which the question is asked. There is nothing in the nature of man or of society and its institutions that makes it impossible to rectify all injustices and to remove all deprivations. If the limit of institutional progress is defined formally as the best possible society, in which all men will have the opportunity to make good lives for themselves, then that limit will be reached, or at least very closely approached, when revolutionary or civil progress has brought into existence a classless society that embraces all men in a world state under a world government that is constitutional, democratic, and socialistic. Nothing less than this will completely abolish war, racism, and poverty from the face of the earth; or maximize, through justice, freedom and equality for all.

Let us further suppose that the fullest realization of this political ideal is accompanied by satisfactory solutions of the population problem, the problem of preserving a healthful ecological balance in the environment, and the problem of providing effective liberal schooling for all. What then? What does the future hold for man beyond the point at which his institutions are perfected so that no injustices remain to be rectified and no deprivations remain to be remedied? What is the ultimate goal toward which the human race can and should collectively strive after all the external conditions of human life are optimal and stable?

Only one answer seems to be possible. Progress in human affairs will shift from the realm of externals—the realm of social, economic, and political institutions—to the interior life of man, the life of the mind and the spirit. Progress in institutions will be replaced by progress in individuals. The ultimate goal of human striving ought to be the fullest development of the potentialities of the human mind and spirit, a development that will not begin in earnest until the realization of the political ideal provides all men with the external conditions under which they can devote themselves to the highest pursuits of which the human race is capable—teaching and learning.

When no obstacles or barriers stand in the way of the effective and sustained communication of the members of the human race with one another, and when the human mind is no longer distracted from concentration on what is important by the urgency of practical problems that press for solution, then the cooperative engagement of men in teaching and learning as lifelong pursuits should be the chief source of progress toward fulfilling the capacities for understanding and wisdom, for friendship and love, that are the distinctive powers of the human mind and spirit.